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In Europe and in Britain between 1918-1922, Great 
Britain and its Prime Minister David Lloyd George greatly 
i~luenced the political and diplomatic occurrences. In 
the latter part of 1918, during the National Election cam-
paign, Lloyd George appeared to have committed Britain to 
the pursuit of a vindictive peace settlement at the forth-
coming Paris Peace Co~erence. Earlier, on January 5, 1918, 
Lloyd George's war aims speech had set a tone of moderation, 
That sense of moderation was now betrayed by these vindic-
tive election pledges, Therefore, it is widely believed 
that the election pledges so hampered the British peace 
delegation that it was virtually impossible to create a just 
and lasting peace settlement for Germany and Europe, The 
election appeared to have placed a dark cloud over the 
liberal- sounding peace program that Lloyd George had out-
lined before the armistice. The number of positions open 
to Lloyd George at the conference were probably diminished, 
but he managed to out-maneuver most of his political 
opponents and conduct his own moderate style of peace-
making. 
There are still many questions that remain regard-
ing Lloyd George's peace policies and also regarding the 
impact of the election on British peace diplomacy and on 
Lloyd George's ability to conduct his own particular style 
of conference diplomacy from 1919-1922. While the election 
apparently committed the British to a harsh peace, Lloyd 
George and the British delegation sought a relatively 
moderate settlement. There were, of course, practical 
limits to what any nation could expect to accomplish at 
Paris. The Paris Peace Conference would satisfy few people, 
but Lloyd George was confident that peace in Europe could 
somehow be realized. He believed that by keeping the 
European powers at the conference table progress could be 
achieved. Lloyd George felt that if diplomats were talking, 
progress would ultimately be made in shaping a working and 
lasting peace. 
British Conference diplomacy, which seemed to be 
very generous to Germany, was at odds with a more aggressive 
French policy which was apparently determined to keep Ger-
many weak and to make her comply with all the terms of the 
Versailles Treaty. However, it is not intended that this 
study be an analysis of the failure of the Treaty of 
Versailles and the interested powers to maintain peace 
after 1919, Rather, it will be an effort to study the 
policies stated in the Election of 1918 and the more moder-
ate and consistent policies actually pursued during the 
balance of Lloyd George's tenure as Prime Minister. 
Information and data for the thesis were gathered 
from various sourcebooks, Primary sources were used such 
as British Foreign Policy Documents, British Cabinet 
Minutes, U.S. State Department Documents and various other 
public documents. Document collections of the Paris Peace 
Conference and other conferences held between 1919 and 1922 
were also relied upon, Secondary sources were also used 
such as memoirs, diaries, letters, topical monographs, 
autobiographies and biographies, newspaper and journal 
articles. 
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In Europe and in Britain between 1918-1922, 
Great Britain and its Prime Minister David Lloyd George 
greatly inf'luenced the political and diplomatic 
occurrences. In the latter part of 1918, during the 
National Election campaign, Lloyd George appeared to have 
committed Britain to the pursuit of a vindictive peace 
settlement at the forthcoming Paris Peace Conference. 
Earlier, on January 5, 1918, Lloyd George's war aims 
speech had set a tone for moderation. That sense of 
moderation was noij;.'betrayed by these vindictive election 
pledges. Therefpre, it is widely believed that the 
election pledges so hampered the British peace delegation 
that it was virtually impossible to create a just and 
lasting peace settlement for Germany and Europe. The 
election appeared to have placed a dark cloud over the 
liberal-sounding peace program that Lloyd George had 
outlined before the armistice. The number of positions 
open to Lloyd George at the conference were probably 
diminished, but he managed to out-maneuver most of his 
political opponents and conduct his own moderate style of 
peacemaking. 
1 
There are still many questions that remain re-
garding Lloyd George's peace policies and also regarding 
the impact of the election on British peace diplomacy 
2 
and on Lloyd George's ability to conduct his own partic-
ular style of conference diplomacy from 1919-1922. While 
the election apparently committed the British to a harsh 
peace, Lloyd George and the British delegation sought a 
relatively moderate settlement. There were, of course, 
practical limits to what any nation could expect to accom-
plish at Paris. The Paris Peace Conference would satisfy 
few people, but Lloyd George was confident that peace in 
Europe could somehow be realized. He believed that by 
keeping the European powers at the conference table prog-
ress could be achieved. Lloyd George felt that if 
diplomats were talking, progress would ultimately be made 
in shaping a working and lasting peace. 
British Conference diplomacy, which seemed to be 
very generous to Germany, was at odds with a more aggres-
sive French policy which was apparently determined to keep 
Germany weak and to make her comply with all the terms of 
the Versailles Treaty. However, it is not intended that 
this study be an analysis of the failure of the Treaty of 
Versailles and the interested powers to maintain peace after 
1919- Rather, it will be an effort to study the policies 
stated in the Election of 1918 and the more moderate and 
J 
consistent policies actually pursued during the balance of 
Lloyd George's tenure as Prime Minister. 
Chapter 2 
PLANS FOR PEACE 
The primary concern of this chapter is the for-
mulation of Lloyd George's war aims and peace plan, as well 
as a study of his ability to maintain a consistent policy 
of moderation. During Lloyd George's years as Prime 
Minister, 1916-1922, he had to deal with two basic and 
important problems; the problems were that of waging war 
and then making and maintaining peace. 
When ~loyd George became Prime Minister in 1916, 
Britain was intent on stopping the German drive for 
mastery of Europe and the restoration of Belgian and French 
lands. At this point in the war the resumption of the 
Somme offensive on the western front had occurred; there 
had been an attack on Bulgaria in the east and virtually 
no action at all in any of the secondary theatres of war. 1 
There was actually no one who had enumerated point by point 
a peace program. 2 When Lloyd George finally did announce 
Britain's terms, he was persuaded to do so by a number of 
1Peter Rowland, Lloyd George (Barrie and Jenkins, 
Ltd., 1975), pp.J82-J8J. 
4 
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forces, all ultimately requiring him to make an official 
pronouncement of war aims. The general principles for 
peace and the future of Europe were made public in January 
of 1918. 
Lloyd George never aspired to be a Wilsonian 
idealist in his peacemaking. He was too much a political 
realist for that. He did believe that there might be a 
great and peaceful Europe someday, but this had to be 
achieved in a gradual manner. Most of all, he wanted eco-
nomic recovery at home and abroad and he wished to avoid a 
return to the pre-1914 era of diplomacy through alliance 
and intimidation. On this matter France was his most for-
midable opponent at the end of the war. 
Before Lloyd George became Prime Minister, he was 
dedicated to a vigorous prosecution of the war effort, 
advocating "the knock-out blow in the belief that as Sec-
retary of War, he was about to deliver it. 3 
On September 28, -1916, Lloyd George said that 
Britain and France were fighting to end the German menace, 
to peace and that any peace efforts at the moment would be 
premature. In his war memoirs he says, "the motto of the 
Allies was 'Never Again!'. I was myself fresh from a visit 
to the battlefields, and the ghastliness I had witnessed was 
York: 
JA.J.P. Taylor, English History 1g14-1945 (New 
Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 2. 
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something which must never be reenacted. The war must make 
that certain . .,4 
According to A, J.P. Taylor, Lloyd George's 
attempt at the "knock-out blow" was done in order to si-
lence in advance President Wilson's proposal for a 
negotiated peace. 5 At this point in time, Lloyd George 
believed that the war was nearing its end with an Allied 
victory. The Cabinet minutes for Lloyd George's first month 
as Prime Minister indicate that there was considerable re-
luctance to take up any of the Wilsonian peace proposals 
circulated in 1916. It would seem that the general feeling 
in the cabinet was for President of the United States 
Woodrow Wilson not to "butt in" . 6 The feeling against 
peace, however, was not unanimous. On November 13, 1916, 
Lord Lansdowne, who advocated moderate war aims, circulated 
a memorandum, "Respecting Peace Settlement". 7 
In 1916 Lloyd George was still not convinced of 
the need to initiate peace talks. There were no unusual 
4Frank Owen, Tern estuous Journe e 
His Life and Times (New York: McGraw-Hill 
5A.J.P. Taylor, English History, pp.62-63. 
6Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, 
1914-1918, VI (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1957), II, 
p.280. 
7Lloyd George, War Memoirs, II, pp. 288-296. 
pressures on Britain at that time, such as the Bolshevik 
Revolution in 1917, But offers to talk about peace were 
not rejected outright. With regard to the German peace 
7 
offer on December 15, 1916, the Cabinet did not want to 
brush the offer aside, but neither did it wish to call an 
Allied peace conference. The Cabinet felt that a con-
ference might give the impression that the Allies were 
looking at the question in detail- and were considering 
counter-proposals; this might raise false hopes. And when 
it was known that "the conference had only met to dismiss 
the proposals, or to invite the Germans to make further 
proposals," there would be an unfavorable reaction. 8 
Regarding peace talks in 1916, Lord Robert Cecil said that 
a refusal of the Cabinet to respond to terms "might in-
duce ... the pacifists to say there is no hope for peace 
under the existing leadership." 9 The small but vocal num-
ber of pacifists in Britain would have been greatly 
encouraged to know the Cabinet was careful not to anger them. 
The Allies were unable to attain a military 
victory in 1917, so the war continued to drag on with all 
involved feeling the terrible toll of the war. However, 
there were two events of major importance that occurred in 
8Great Britain, Public Record Office, Cabinet 
Office, Minutes of the Cabinet, CAB 23/1, WC 10, December 
18, 1916. (Cabinet papers will be referred to hereafter as 
CAB). 
9cAB 23/1, WC 16, December 23, 1916. 
8 
19171 the entry of the United States and the utter 
collapse of Russia. America's entry into the war, just as 
Russia was beginning to "totter" out of it, was a conso-
lation but it would be many months before she could make 
herself felt. 10 At this time the pacifists and. Union of 
the Democratic Control only increased their pressure on the 
government to make a formal presentation of war aims. 
So by the end of 1917 Lloyd George was convinced 
that a formal presentation of Britain's war aims was ab-
solutely necessary. He was persuaded by a whole host of 
causes: the successive failure of Allied offenses in 1915, 
1916, 1917, and the recent disaster of the Nivelle offensive; 
the withdrawal of labor support of Lloyd George; failure of 
peace conversations with Count Mensdorff of Austria; the 
Lansdowne letter urging moderate war aims; and by his cabi-
net which was very much in favor of an official presentation 
of war aims and peace. 
The year 1917 had been a turning point for Lloyd 
George. The year before he was thorougly convinced that a 
knock- out blow would soon be delivered; now he was thor-
oughly disillusioned with the way the war was being conducted 
and fought by the Generals. C.P.Scott recorded Lloyd 
George's outlook on the war and peace in December of 1917, 
Scott felt that Lloyd George wanted his own way in matters 
10Peter Rowland, Lloyd George, p. 401, 
9 
concerning war policy. For example, Lloyd George wanted 
to stop lifelosing attacks on the west and use only heavy 
counter-strokes; while standing on the defensive "Lloyd 
George is taking a more moderate attitude ..... 11 Lloyd 
George also reported that "there is a good deal of feeling 
in the War Cabinet toward peace. "12 In July the Cabinet 
agreed to "postpone the discussion of war aims as long as 
possible,"13 but by December the feeling of the War Cabinet 
distinctly changed. The Bolshevik Revolution came as a 
timely reminder of the costs of military exhaustion and 
defeat under conditions of mounting political tensions. 
Otherwise Britain might possibly have attempted to hold out 
for unconditional surrender. Had it not been for the 
effects of the Bolshevik Revolution, Britain might not have 
considered the war aims and peace plans as an acceptable 
basis for armistice negotiations at this time. On January 
1, 1918, Thomas Jones found the Cabinet atmosphere com-
pletely changed. He said that "everybody was talking of 
peace," He said "the line now is to publish a declara-
tion on war aims as a counter-offensive to the offer of the 
11Trevor Wilson, ed., The Political Diaries of 
C.P.Scott, 1911-1928 (Ithica, New York: Cornell University 
Press, 1970), pp. 323-324. 
12Trevor Wilson, Diaries of C.P. Scott, p.325. 
13cAB 23/3, WC 187(19), July 16, 1917, 
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Central Powers to the Bolsheviks (Brest-Litovsk)."14 
There was not complete agreement in the War Cabinet for a 
categorical statement of war aims. Arthur Balfour, first 
Lord of the Admiralty, wrote to his colleague Lord Robert 
Cecil, Minister of the Blockade, that talk continued about 
defining war aims and that this is "a problem in which I 
take no very great interest, because, as it seems to one, 
there is not the slightest difficulty in defining what ends 
we want to attain by the war." He felt the problem was in 
how far the Allies would be willing to go to attain their 
ends .15 
The traditional interpretation of British War 
Aims is that they were prepared in response to growing do-
mestic pacifist and labor opposition to the war and to the 
Brest-Litovsk peace pffer of the Bolsheviks. This inter-
pre~ation is only partially correct. Recently opened 
documents give far more credit to Lloyd George and his War 
Cabinet. 16 It is now evident that Lloyd George's govern-
ment had been giving consideration to defining war aims, as 
well as giving considered thought to a compromise peace 
14Thomas Jones, Whitehall Diary, 1916-1925, ed. 
Keith Middlemas, I, (London1 Oxford University Press, 1969), 
p. 42. 
15Lloyd George, War Memoirs, V, pp.19-54. 
16David R.Woodward, "The Origins and Intent of 
David Lloyd George's January 5 War Aims· Speech", The His-
torian, 34 (November, 1971), pp.22-39, 
11 
settlement, before the mounting demands for a definition 
of war aims reached a peak in late 1917, He was first of 
all disappointed over realization that a "knock-out blow" 
was not possible and he maintained a constant fascination 
with the possibility of "detaching Austria" from the 
Central Powers. 17 
A number of interesting points of British policy 
emerge during the discussion and preparation of war aims. 
Lloyd George was willing to undertake rather drastic mea-
sures such as sacrificing Britain's ally Russia to Ger-
many if necessary, but he was "unwilling to seek peace at any 
price."18 Lloyd George did not believe it good policy to 
destroy Germany "If we were to beat Germany to nothing-
ness, then we must beat Europe to nothingness, too,"19 
Although this statement was made by General Smuts of the 
Union of South Africa, it is mentioned because of Smut's 
very great influence over Lloyd George as a constant moder-
ating force in the Cabinet and later at the Paris Peace Con-
ference. The moderate idea that Germany should not be 
destroyed was in evidence at the Paris Peace Conference in 
Reign 
p. 25, 
17Harold Nicolson, King George V: His Life and 
(London: Pan Books, Ltd., 1967), pp.409-415. 
18navid R,Woodward, "The Origins and Intent", 
19cAB 2J/14, WC 491, October 26, 1918, 
March 1919, when he said of Germany and reparations, "We 
cannot both cripple her and expect her to pay."20 
12 
This, therefore, is the basic idea of Lloyd 
George's diplomacy, 1918-1922. Throughout the preparation 
of war aims, the Cabinet and other political leaders were 
consulted and kept abreast of their development. 21 Lloyd 
George implied, although he did not always do so, that he 
would consult with the Opposition leaders, with the leaders 
of Labour and with the representatives of the Dominions, 
such as were available. 22 This was to be the first major 
definition of war aims by the government and the world 
would be watching. 
There were four men primarily responsible for the 
final drafting of war aims: Lloyd George, General Smuts, 
Philip Kerr, a member of Lloyd George's personal Secre-
tariat, and Maurice Hankey, Cabinet Secretary to the War 
Committee. Meanwhile,thecCabinet continued its discussion 
of war aims and the most effective manner to present them. 
The Cabinet felt that the declaration of war aims should 
show Britain and the Allies, Austria, Turkey and Germany, 
20w.K. Hancock, Smuts: The San uine Years 18 0-
1.21-2. (London: Cambridge University Press, 19 1 , I, pp, 
~510. 
21Marvin Swartz, The Union of Democratic Control 
in British Politics Durin the First World War (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1971 , p. 19 
22CAB 23/5, WC 314, January 4, 1918, 
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that Britain would go to "the extreme limit of concessions" 
and that "our object was not to destroy the enemy nations•:23 
Lloyd George believed it was essential to convince the nation 
that Britain was not continuing the war merely to gain a 
vindictive or looting truimph, but that Britain had definite 
peace aims and that these were both just and attainable, 24 
Lloyd George also accepted a Cabinet suggestion that he 
state Britain's war aims before the Trade Unionists who were 
currently meeting in London. 
The decision to go before the Trade Unionists 
has been given significance as a concession to the mounting 
pressure from Labor and the Union of Democratic Control, 
But Lloyd George was not going before them with the intention 
of bending to their demands, The Cabinet minutes reveal 
that the decision was based entirely upon "convenience," 
since Parliament was not currently meeting and the Trade 
Unionists would surely raise the war aims issue. The Cabi-
net felt that the appropriate place for Lloyd George to make 
his statement would be the House of Commons, but since the 
House of Commons was not in session, the meeting of the 
Trades Unionists afforded the most convenient opportunity 
and it would be advisable and desirable to take advantage of 
it. "It was suggested, and generally admitted, that there 
23CAB 23/5, WC 312, January 3, 1918, 
24Lloyd George, War Memoirs, V, p.38. 
would be some adverse criticism to a statement made by 
the Trades Unionists" because it would give them exaggerated 
importance over other sections of the community. 25 The 
government secured labor approval for the war aims statement 
and therefore, Lloyd George delivered his moderate war aims 
address of 5 January 1918 "not to Parliament but to a 
Trades Union conference at Claxton Hall in London," 26 
According to Arno Mayer's study of Lloyd George's 
speech on war aims, the decision to make a presentation 
rested on three points: domestic pressures, foreign de-
mands, and Lloyd George's change of mind. "The British 
Premier presently considered the utility and substance of 
a major diplomatic pronouncement," The "converging polit-
ical pressures" from the United States and Russia "were 
also not unrelated to the ominous military statement." 27 
The presentation of the war aims speech was well-
received and Lloyd George was confident that he had, for 
the moment, taken the wind out of the sails of the "peace-
at-any-price" brigade, Three days later, President Wilson 
put forward his Fourteen Points as the basis of a peace 
settlement. The second point, in particular, "Freedom of 
25CAB 23/5, WC 312, January 3, 1918, 
26Marvin Swartz, The Union of Democratic Control, 
p, 198. 
27Arno Mayer, Wilson Vs.Lenin, P, 313, 
the Seas," was quite unacceptable to Britain and would 
obviously have to be argued about at a later date. 28 
15 
Lloyd George's speech was not so unreservedly 
idealistic as it appeared on the surface. The German 
colonies were to be disposed of on "the general principle 
of self-determination" in other words, they would not 
be returned to Germany. Again, though "national" Turkey 
was respected, the Straits were to be "internationalised 
and neutralised," and "Arabia, Armenia, Syria and Palestine 
are in our judgment entitled to a recognition of their sep-
arate conditions" meaning that they were to be largely 
partitioned between England and France. The recognition of 
Austria-Hungary was largely tactical, due to the fact that 
negotiations were still going on for a compromise peace. 
So Lloyd George had other aims beyond satisfying Labour. 
His speech was in part an answer to the Bolshevik program 
of no annexations and indemnities. 29 
The Times of London heralded the speech as "an 
impressive proof of unity."JO The article stated that the 
war aims speech was "a carefully-weighed and exactly-phrased 
state paper of national character and world-wide appeal." 
It was a speech which not only was a statement of govern-
Lloyd George, pp.1+28-1+29. 28Peter Rowland, 
29 A.J.P. Taylor, English History, pp.50-111+. 
pp.6J-7J, JOLloyd George, War Memoirs, V, 
16 
ment policy, but also of national scope.31 No where in the 
Times' reports of Lloyd George's speech is there talk of 
coercion by "special interests."32 The Times went on to 
report that the Prime Minister had also made his reply to 
the-· "enemy and to the Bolsheviks." Lloyd George had given 
his speech with a strong turn of moderation, but at the 
same time, he outlined the peace conditions that would be 
the "irreducible minimum of the Allied terms ..... 33 Lastly, 
the Times reported the speech as having been delivered 
with a "moderation that may disconcert some tried friends 
of the Allies ... 34 
Virtually every point of Lloyd George's war aim 
speech paralleled Wilson's Fourteen Points, with the excep-
tion of the freedom of the seas. The last paragraphs of 
his speech carry the basic principles upon which Lloyd 
George would seek peace: 
If, then, we are asked what are we fighting for, 
we reply, as we have often replied: We are fighting 
for a just and a lasting peace, and we believe that 
before permanent peace can be hoped for three condi-
tions must be fulfilled. 
31Lloyd George, War Memoirs, V, pp.63-73. 
32 A,J,P.Taylor, The Troublemakers: 
Over Foreign Policy 1792-1939 (Bloomington: 
versity.Press, 1958), p,151, 
Dissent 
Indiana Uni-
33L10yd George, War Memoirs, V, p;p. 63-73, 
34Lloyd George, War Memoirs, V, pp.63-73, 
17 
First, the sanctity of treaties must be reestab-
lished; secondly, a territorial settlement must be 
secured based on the right of self-determination of 
the consent of the governed; and, lastly, we must seek 
by the creation of some international organization to · 
limit the burden of armaments and diminish the prob-
ability of war. In these conditions the British Empire 
would welcome peace; to secure those conditions its 
peoples are prepared to make even
3
§reater sacrifices 
than those they have yet endured. 
Although Lloyd George's moderate war aims speech 
was well-received both at home and abroad, its effect on the 
Germans and Austrims was disheartening. On January 24, the 
Reichstag turned down Lloyd George and Wilson's plan. 36 
But Lloyd George was undaunted by the fai_lure of his war 
aims speech to attract interest from the Central Powers. 
According to David Woodward, "Lloyd George's 
actions during this perilous period of the war denote con-
siderable indecision and experimentation. He clearly had·no 
permanent peace plan."37 However, Lloyd George did have a 
set of definite points upon which to build a peace and he 
was always searching to find the right answer to a question. 
The war aims principles were a bold act, the first major 
definition of war aims by one of the Allied powers. There 
is no real evidence that points to "indecision" on the part 
of Lloyd George. Throughout the development of the war aims, 
35Lloyd George, War Memoirs, v, p.73. 
36Lloyd George, War Memoirs, V, pp.44-47, 
37David R.Woodward, "Origins and Intent", p,39. 
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Lloyd George projected a policy of moderation and flexibility 
which he believed to be successful. He was very willing to 
consider a negotiated peace. 
During the months between Lloyd George's War Aims 
speech given on January 5, and October 4, 1918, when the 
German government appealed to President Wilson for armistice 
terms and the opening of peace negotiation, nothing new was 
added to the peace policy by Britain or the other Allied 
countries. To the German note of October 4, "Wilson replied 
on the basis of his Fourteen Points and for nearly three 
weeks negotiated directly and with considerable inconsist-
ency. During this period his allies were hard put to dis-
cover the policy to which they were pledged."38 
The Cabinet held an animated and somewhat confused 
meeting on October 15 discussing Wilson's second note to 
Germany. Discussion jumped from Poland, to Russia, to 
Turkey, to Clemenceau, and to the League of Nations. The 
Cabinet decided that it would be in its best interest for 
Wilson to continue his conversations with Germany. And 
Lloyd George defended the securing of a military armistice 
by saying that "it was not sufficient for Germany to express 
readiness to negotiate on the basis of the Fourteen Points 
unless we were in a position to insist on her accepting 
38Thomas Jones, Whitehall, editor's note, p.67. 
19 
the, .. sacred text, .,39 This was in keeping with Lloyd 
George's previous commitments. Once Europe was freed from 
the domination of German militarism, one could talk about a 
lasting peace in Europe, 
Lloyd George was determined to conclude the war 
with an Allied victory, "Germany should be beaten," He 
believed Britain must continue until she could "dictate 
" b . 40 terms and be a le to create ", .. a League of Nations," 
But he did not seek a vindictive peace settlement. 
Thus, the stage was set for the upcoming General 
Election of 1918, 
39 4 W,K.Hancock, Smuts, I, p. 93, 
40cAB 23, WC 459, August 15, 1918, 
Chapter J 
GENERAL ELECTION OF 1918 
The Allied and Associated powers adopted a peace 
policy on November 4, 1918, during a meeting of the Supreme 
War Council at Versailles. These powers offered peace with 
Germany on the basis of Wilson's Fourteen Points and sub-
sequent addresses and were careful to note the following1 
"They (Allied and Associated powers] must reserve to them-
selves complete freedom on this subject when they enter the 
Peace Conference," and they also must require that compen-
sation would be made "for all damage done to the civilian 
population of the Allies and their property by the 
aggression of Germany ... "1 These reservations were accepted 
by Wilson and the Germans informed of the modifications on 
November 5, 1918, Lloyd George, Prime Minister 1916-1922, 
reported to the Cabinet that after having studied all of 
President Wilson's peace addresses "he could not find a 
single point which he wanted that was not amply covered, 
with the exception of the points regarding the freedom of 
the seas and indemnities, and our position in regard to 
these matters had been duly given." 2 
1David Lloyd George, War Memoirs, VI, pp.28J-284. 
2CAB 23, WC 497, November 5, 1918. 
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Therefore, in early November it looked as if 
Lloyd George had set out to fulfill two basic aims: the 
defeat of the German militarism and a just and moderate 
settlement built on Wilsonian principles. But by mid-
21 
December, after a resounding general election victory won 
by Lloyd George and his coalition, it appeared that Lloyd 
George had given into a mass hysteria demanding "hang the 
Kaiser." As to the "hanging of the Kaiser", Lloyd George 
contends that he never used the phrase. Lloyd George said1 
The Kaiser must be prosecuted. The war was a 
crime ... The war was a hideous abominable crime ... 
Is no one responsible? ... The men responsible for this 
outrage on the human race must not be let off because 
their heads were crowned when they perpetrated the 
deed,3 
Lloyd George's conduct during the election raised 
serious doubts as to Lloyd George's ability to maintain a 
consistent policy of moderation. It seems that the type of 
settlement the British wanted remained essentially vague 
and fluctuated constantly. Harold Nicolson found it 
"unfortunate that a British Liberal should have placed him-
self at the mercy of a jingo Commons and a jingo Press. 4 
At this point in time, it looks as if Lloyd George possibly 
had more fundamental problems to worry about than the 
election pledges. He had lost the support of the Liberals 
3David Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Confer-
ence, I (New Haven: Yale University Press,. 1939), p.109, 
4sir Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919 (New York: 
Gosset and Dunlop, 1965), p. 20, 
22 
and later became dependent upon the Conservatives ~o sus-
tain him in office. 
Lloy,d George and the "Khaki Election" have often 
been held responsible for preventing Britain from securing 
a just peace and also responsible for tarnishing the entire 
atmosphere of the Paris Peace Conference, Lloyd George had 
committed himself to a rigorous peace, but always with 
qualifications of moderation. 
In the summer of 1918, there were several compelling 
reasons for an early general elections The House of 
Commons did not represent current political circumstances; 
it had been elected in 1910 and was extended three years 
beyond its five-year term because of the War. Also, as a 
limited franchise, women had been given the right to vote 
in 1918 and this was a good opportunity for them to exer-
cise this new power. Furthermore, the late summer advance 
of the Allies on the Western front seemed to some individuals, 
but not all, an end of war and, likewise, a safe opportunity 
to resume party controversy. Most important, the improving 
military situation enabled the Coalition Government to 
appeal to the people as the Government that had won the 
war. 5 
5Robert E.Bunselmeyer, The Cost of the War 1914-
1.21.2. (Hamden, Connecticut: The Shoe String Press, 1975), 
p. 121. 
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In July, 1918, Coalition Conservatives and 
Liberals began to make private preparations for an elec-
t . 6 ion. King George V met with Lloyd George on November 5, 
1918, and Lloyd George informed him that he would be asking 
for a dissolution in the near future. The King finally 
agreed to a "dissolution of Parliament at an early date. ".7 
The next day Lloyd George announced this decision to the 
Liberal members of the Government. On November 12, Lloyd 
George and Unionist Party leader Bonar Law won the consent 
of their respective followers to an election. They had 
agreed early in November to conduct a Coalition election 
as soon as military conditions made it possible "to return 
candidates who undertake to support the present government 
not only to prosecute the war to its final end and nego-
tiate the peace, but also to deal with the problems of 
reconstruction which must immediately arise as an armistice 
is signed. ,, 3 
Lloyd George was seeking an election mandate to 
go to Paris to make peace and yet, ironically, his original 
pledges and commitments to the Unionists contained no men-
1914-1935 
6Trevor Wilson, The Downfall of the Liberal Party 
(London, Collins, Fontana Library, 1968), p.141. 
7sir Harold Nicolson, King George V, pp.428-429, 
8Arno J.Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy of Peace-
making: Containment and Counterrevolution at Versailles 
1918-1919 (New York1 A.A.Knopf, 1967), p,137, 
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tion of foreign. policy. He had made commitments to the 
Conservatives on Irish Home Rule, Imperial preference, and 
even promised to reconsider aspects of the Welsh Church 
Act. Lloyd George lacked the necessary political machine 
to conduct an election as a Lloyd George Liberal. He found 
the choice was either to compromise liberal principles and 
accept the support of the Conservatives (Unionists) or go 
it alone and it seems he preferred to manage a coali-
tion government. Lloyd George was, indeed, as widely 
popular as a Prime Minister had ever been, but only about 
100 of the 260 Liberal MPs in Parliament supported him. 
The Conservatives, on the other hand, were a highly organ-
ized political party and held 282 seats in the Commons, 
but no Conservative approached having the same electoral 
appeal of Lloyd George. 10 In these circumstances, coali-
tion made sense. But in the long run, it turned out to be 
the Coalition alliance which caused Lloyd George to step 
down in 1922. 
Public designation of Coalition candidates had to 
be taken care of. This was especially necessary because of 
the confusing party situation in November 1918, For 
example, each of the three major parties contained both 
supporters of the Coalition and an independent wing. There 
were 81 Independent Conservative candidates in the 1918 
10Robert E.Bunselmeyer, The Cost of the War, p,122. 
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election, but they were independent only in the sense that 
they did not have formal 0oalition approval of their cam-
paigns. Thirty-six of the 81 were candidates in Ulster, 
where Coalition leaders thought approval was neither 
desirable or necessary. Most of the remainder were candi-
dates of local Conservative associations which refused to 
stand aside for a Coalition Liberal. Almost all of the 
normally independent Conservative candidates supported 
Coalition programs and those elected voted with the Govern-
ment in the New House of Commons. 11 In these conditions, 
Coalition leaders were naturally anxious to indicate 
publicly who were and who were not their supporters. 
The Coalition chose to do this by sending brief 
public letters of support to candidates they approved, 
These letters were compared to ration coupons by Coalition 
opponents; hence the Coupon Election of 1918, The deri-
sive name was in answer to Lloyd George's claim that 
coupons were sent to men who had patriotically supported 
the Government during the War and denied to those who had 
not. This "coupon" was given to 364 Conservatives, 159 
Liberals and 18 candidates of the National Democratic Party. 
The election was a very strong victory for the Coalition and 
the end of hope for a powerful independent Liberal party. 
11John McEwen, "The Coupon Election of 1918 and 
Unionist Members of Parliament," Journal of Modern History, 
34 (September, 1962), p. 295. 
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The "coupon" was quite effective. Of the 541 "couponed" 
candidates, 478 were returned, Independent Liberals 27; 
Coalition Liberals 138; Conservatives 335; the balance of 
the Coalition were National Democratic Party members, 
Lloyd George's political maneuvering was part of an over-
all strategic plan to ensure his political survival. It 
changed his situation only by defining it more clearly, 
Thus, the main purpose of the coupon arrangement was to 
make permanent the existing political state of affairs. 
From the start his premiership had depended principally on 
the Conservatives, and his electoral bargain showed that he 
intended to remain in office by their support, even if this 
meant open hostility to the Liberal party. The same was 
true of his behaviour during the campaign. 12 Therefore, 
political pragmatism and opportunism secured his election, 
but made him entirely dependent upon the Conservatives, 
War Committee Member Leo S,Amery observed that 
"Lloyd George had a natural instinct for strategy "during 
the World War; therefore, Amery must have also agreed that 
Lloyd George possessed the same ability in politics. 13 The 
manner in which Lloyd George conducted his campaign, 
delivering speeches to fit the character and mood of the 
12Trevor Wilson, The Downfall, pp,159-160. 
13 L.S.Amery, War 
My Political Life (Landoni 
and Peace 1914-1929, Vol.II, 
Hutchinson, 1953), p.96. 
27 
individual crowds, proved him also to be a master of tac-
tics as well. 
The election itself seemed rather listless with 
only 57,6 per cent of the electorate in contested divisions 
voting. 14 This was the lowest turnout in twentieth-century 
British history. There are a number of explanations about 
this apathy: war weariness combined with a psychological 
let down about National affairs after the Armistice; the 
large number of soldiers and war industry workers who were 
discouraged by the nuisance of absentee voting; confusion 
produced by the unusual number and variety of candidates; 
the inefficiency of the new electoral registers; and the 
rampant influenza virus which was blanketing Britain, to 
name a few. Another important reason for the apathy was 
the obvious fact that there was to be no close contest 
between the Coalition and its opponents. 15 
The absence of drama had two effects on the way 
the campaign was to be carried out: First, it opened the 
door to emotional issues that had a seemingly non-partisan, 
patriotic appeal, such as those of the anti-German temper. 
Thus, Christopher Addison, one of Lloyd George's 
14charles Loch Mowat, Britain Between the Wars 
1918-1940 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), 
PP· 6-7, 
15s~eeches of November 13 and December 7; The 
Times (London), November 14, 1918, p,7, and Morning Post 
(London), December 9, 1918, p,9, 
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former right-hand men at the Ministry of Munitions, who 
found his district apathetic, also told a reporter he was 
"struck" by his constituents' determination to try the 
ex-Kaiser and expel German aliens from Britain. 16 Second, 
the absence of a close contest encouraged the press and 
electors to focus their attention on the governing party 
and especially on the Prime Minister Lloyd George. 
Lloyd George's election campaign began on a note 
of reason and moderation and ordinary political maneuver. 
On November 12, he addressed a meeting of Liberals saying, 
"I have done nothing ... which makes me ashamed to meet my 
fellow Liberals. Please God, I am determined that I never 
shall!"17 He continued to describe the desired nature of 
the peace settlement1 
What are the principles on which that settlement 
is to be effected1 Are we to lapse back into the old 
national rivalries and animosities and competitive 
armaments, or are we to initiate the reign on earth 
of the Prince of Peace ... No settlement which con-
travenes the principles of eternal justice will be a 
permanent one .. ; We must not allow any sense of 
revenge, any spirit of greed, any grasping desire to 
override the fundamental principles of righteousness 
... the mandate of this Government at the forthcoming 
election will mean that the British delegation to the 
Peace Conference will be in favour of a just peace ... 
In my judgment the League of Nations is an absolute 
essential to permanent peace. We shall go to the 
16The Times, November 28, 1918, 
17The Times, November 13, 1918. 
Peace Conference to gy~rantee that the League of 
Nations is a reality.1 
29 
In the same speech, concerning domestic matters 
Lloyd George said, "Let us utilize victory to get the 
necessary impetus for reform! We must instantly take in 
hand an improvement of the conditions of the people."19 
However, in his second major address, at Newcastle 
on November 29, the Prime Minister moved toward a more 
radical position. Lloyd George began by saying early in 
his speech that "It must be a just peace, a sternly just 
peace, a relentlessly just peace." Germany had lost the 
war and " ... must pay the costs of the war up to the limit 
of her capacity to do so." Lloyd George concluded his 
remarks on peacemaking by reminding his audience that Ger-
many had started the war. The Government, therefore, inten-
ded to arrange a trail of the ex-Kaiser. 20 
The course of the campaign speech and the hysteria 
of the crowds led Lloyd George to endorse the idea that 
Germany must be punished and she must pay for the war. In 
a series of speeches21 from November 29 - December 11, 1918, 
18The Times, November 13, 1918. 
19The Times, November 13, 1918. 
20The Times, November 30, 1918. 
21For text of various speeches, see The Times, 
November 30, 1918; December 6-13, 1918. 
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Lloyd George's tone became more nationalistic. By December 
4, anti-German terms for peace far outshadowed the wartime 
concern about trade competition. From November 29 until 
December 14, the anti-German issues were the main election 
theme for the Coalition Candidates. 
A Coalition manifesto, dated December 11, 1918, 
was quite succinct1 
1, Punish the Kaiser. 
2. Make Germany pay. 
J. Get the soldiers home as quickly as possible. 
4. Fair treatment to the returned soldier and 
sailor. 
5, Better housing and better social conditions. 22 
Lloyd George's speech at Bristol on December 11, 1918, 
encompassed these points. Lloyd George led his audience to 
believe that Britain "had an absolute right to demand the 
whole cost of the war from Germany". The Allied cost of 
the war according to the "expert" British Imperial Committee 
was~ 24,000,000,000; but another Government financial 
servant had warned Lloyd George that Germany might never be 
able to pay that much. Certainly Lloyd George knowingly 
baited and intended to excite his audience by mentioning 
the extraordinary figure of his experts. That was why, he 
continued, "we will extract the last penny we can out of 
Germany up to the limit of her capacity, but I am not going 
to mislead the public on the question of capacity ... and I 
22M . P t orning os , December 2, 1918, p.7. 
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am not going to do it in order to win votes." 23 The 
audience paid little attention to Lloyd George's qualific-
ations, nor apparently did he expect his audience to. 
Finally, Lloyd George summarized his position by 
saying that Britain has an absolute right to demand the 
whole cost of the war from Germany and that Britain would 
do just that. But Lloyd George said that the cost must be 
extracted in such a way that it would not do more harm to 
the country that receives it than the country which is pay-
ing for it. He concluded by saying that the Allies, in 
24 conjunction with Britain, are also studying the proposal, 
Confidentially, Lloyd George said that he and 
Bonar Law regarded the report of the expert committee study-
ing Germany's capacity as "fantastic chimera." 25 The 
committee to investigate German reparation liability con-
sisted of William M.Hughes, Prime Minister of Australia; 
Walter Long, Tory Politician; George Foster, economist; 
Lord Cunliffe, the Governor General of the Bank of England; 
Herbert Gibbs, London Banker; W.A.S. Hewins, economist. The 
23The Times, December 12, 1918. Cited also in 
David Lloyd George, The Truth About Reparations and War 
Debts (New York: Howard Fertig, 1970), pp.14-15. 
24The Times, December 12, 1918, and Lloyd George, 
The Truth About Reparation, pp.14-15, 
25Lloyd George, Peace Conference Memoirs, I, 
p.305. 
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political orientation of this committee was hardly a repre-
sentative body of opinion. The committee's report which 
estimated Germany's capacity to pay at~ 24,000,000,000 
was circulated freely by Lloyd George; even though he felt 
the report was "fantastic chimera," it had electoral value. 
Lloyd George knew how to employ his "experts" well, He 
used the same ploy at Paris on numerous occasions. Charles 
Seymour and Norman Davis of the American Peace Delegation 
_noted that when Lloyd George meant to do business he 
brought along E.J. Montagu and J.M. Keynes and when he was 
going to hedge he brought in Lord Sumner and Lord Cunliffe. 26 
Lloyd George was quite aware that the Treasury had prepared 
a memorandum, written by economist and Treasury official 
J.M. Keynes in late October and early November, 1918. This 
memorandum concerned indemnity and reparations. In this 
report Keynes recommended a much more realistic reparations 
figure of between~ 2,000,000,000 and~ J,000,000,000. 
Keynes warned about the "Economic consequences of indemnity" 
and, in part conceded that "the capacity of the enemy to pay 
falls short of the probable reparation claim." 27 These 
26
Charles Seymour, Letters from the Paris Peace 
Conference, ed., Harold B.Whiteman,Jr. (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1965), p.276. 
27John Maynard Keynes, Activities and Associated 
Writings: The Treasury and Versailles 1914-1919, Vol.XVI, 
The Collected Writin s of John Ma ard Ke nes, ed. Elizabeth 
Johnson London: Macmillan, 1971 , pp.JJ -J8J. 
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figures were, of course, not as politically impressive as 
the figures recommended by the other "expert" committee; 
Lloyd George did want to win the election, and therefore, 
at this point in time, chose to ignore these figures in 
favor of the more sensational ones of the other committee, 
Others also had much to say about the election. 
It was Sir Eric Geddes, Minister of Ways and Communications 
for Demobilization of the British Armed Forces, who origi-
nated the cry of squeezing the German lemon. He felt 
Germany should pay restitution and reparation and felt that 
"we will get everything out of her that you can squeeze out 
of a lemon and a bit more .. ,,28 After Geddes' speech, 
the popular cry was "squeeze the German lemon until the 
pips squeak!"29 But C.P. Scott, the influential editor of 
the Manchester Guardian, was understanding of Lloyd George. 
He felt that Lloyd George meant well at the beginning of 
the election with regard to his stand for a just peace, 
but seemed to lose sight of his goal under the strain of the 
election, 30 Beatrice Webb was more disheartened by the 
election spectacle, She wrote• 
I feel physically sick when I read the frenzied 
appeals of the Coalition leaders - the Prime Minister, 
4, 1918, 
28The Times, December 10, 1918, 
29The Times, December 10, 1918, 
30Trevor Wilson, Diaries of C.P.Scott, December 
p,362. 
Winston Churchill and Geddes - to hang the 
ruin and humiliate the German people, , . 
election talk, but it is mean brutal talk, 
to the electorate.31 
Kaiser, 
It may be 
degrading 
Lloyd George and the Coalition won a landslide 
victory and the Prime Minister received his mandate. One 
author has said of the election that there was so little 
opposition that there was little active enthusiasm. The 
anti-German comments made by Lloyd George seem to have 
gained excessive importance just by the fact that they were 
repeated on more than one occasion. 32 
These anti-German remarks have been pushed for-
ward by individuals seeking to find an easy explanation for 
the failure of the Versailles Treaty. This was a basic 
point of Keynes' Economic Consequences of the Peace, Keynes 
felt that politics had ruined much of the credibility of 
the peace conference. 33 Keynes believed that more important 
was the phasing out of the Liberal party along with the 
resurgence of the Conservatives to which Lloyd George had 
tied himself, The electoral victory and the election prom-
ises made by Lloyd George have been blamed for creating 
political complications which would corrupt the Peace Con-
1912-1924 
1914-1963 
31Margaret I.Cole, ed., Beatrice Webb Diaries 
(London1 Longmans, Green, 1952), p,139, 
32David Thomson, England in the Twentieth Century 
(Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1965), p.60. 
33John Maynard Keynes, The Economic Consequences 
of the Peace (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), Chapter II. 
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ference. Lord Salter, a member of the British Peace dele-
gation, weighed the effect of those pledges first hand. 
Lord Salter felt that Lloyd George had allowed himself to 
be associated and elected with a Parliament that was likely 
to press "for the harshest sort of peace." But as Lloyd 
George was preparing for the peace conference, he recovered 
from the "momentary lapse" and became determined to fight 
for a "peace of reconciliation. ,,J4 Ultimately, Lloyd 
George did continue to handle matters pertaining to peace 
in his own way and his moderate peace policies were basically 
unchanged. 
The Election of 1918 did, however, seem to put a 
damper on Lloyd George
0
's program of moderation. But even 
after the election and political happenings in 1918, Lloyd 
George was still able to continue pursuing peace according 
to his conviction of moderation. Lloyd George was commit-
ted to the war aims he presented in January 1918 and to the 
aims he outlined in November and December of 1918, It was 
these aims and his sincere desire to achieve a just, lasting 
and moderate peace that he carried with him to Paris in 
January, 1919, 
With the passing of the General Election, the 
leaders of the British government and Empire were able to 
34Lord Arthur Salter, Memoirs of a Public Servant 
(London: Faber and Faber, 1961), p.1JO. 
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turn their attention to more deliberate preparations for 
peacemaking. Though not fully agreed among themselves 
about the important subject of compensation from Germany, 
they were able to define their basic aims principally 
that the British Empire should have its just share of what-
ever Germany was able to pay and to marshall the ideas 
and arguments with which these aims might be pursued. 
During the Peace Conference itself, British intentions and 
thoughts were somewhat modified by the need to cooperate 
with President Wilson, by an apparent shift back toward 
Liberalism and moderation in British politics, and by an 
intense and growing desire for demobilization among the 
British public. 
Chapter 4 
PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE 
Even with the many volumes that have been written 
about the Paris Peace Conference, there remains a great deal 
of confusion about Lloyd George at the Paris Peace Con-
ference. Traditionally, he has been viewed as motivated 
only by political expediency: He, Lloyd George, "lives for 
the moment ... and seizes any compromise".;. always ready to 
sacrifice "future benefit for present gain. ,,i J .!VI. Keynes 
believed Lloyd George was thoroughly devoted to making a 
just and lasting peace; however, at Paris the Prime Min-
ister's "naturally good instincts, his industry, and his 
inexhaustable nervous vitality were not serviceable."2 In 
nearly all accounts of the Peace Conference, authors claim 
that Lloyd George was a captive of his election pledges. 
A.J.P. Taylor has described the basic Lloyd George tactic: 
Rupert 
1Arno Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy, pp.571-572. 
2 John Maynard Keynes, Essa~s in Biography (London: 
Hart - Davis, 1951), pp.J6-J . 
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Being a prisoner of the reactionaries, he would 
give his gaolers rope enough to hang themselves. He 
went along with their wild schemes until public opin-
ion in England turned them around; then he appeared 
as the Radical champion. . tardy but victorious.3 
But these were tactics only. Lord Lothian (Philip Kerr) 
observed that Lloyd George was concerned with the future 
implications of present political decisions. On the other 
hand, Wilson was concerned with "remaking the world on 
lines of his own ideas," arid Clemenceau was concerned 
with moulding Europe to the interests of France. 4 
Unlike Woodrow Wilson and Georges Clemenceau, 
Lloyd George's peace-making positions are not well-known. 
Wilson's peace program was outlined in a series of speeches 
"The Fourteen Points," January 8, 1918; "The Four 
Principles," February 11, 1918; "Four Points," July 4,1918; 
"Five Particulars," September 17, 1918. Clemenceau hoped 
to win permanent territorial concessions on the Rhine 
River as well as to gain every concession that would weaken 
Germany and keep her in a second class position of power. 
He was determined to win any concession which would perma-
nently remove the German threat to French security. Inter-
estingly, both Wilson and Clemenceau were no longer in office 
and Lloyd George was the only major political figure at Paris 
1960), 
3A.J.P.Taylor, The Trouble Makers, p.159. 
4J.R.M. Butler, Lord Lothian (London: Macmillan, 
pp.77-78. 
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to survive the Conference and have the opportunity to carry 
out his plans. It seems that most people expected the 
Wilson Peace Program to serve as the ideal basis upon 
which a lasting peace could be built, However, L.S. Amery 
has noted that "Neither the Germans in their utter collapse, 
nor the Allies, after all they had suffered, could ever 
have expected Wilson's Fourteen Points to be taken liter-
ally,"5 Fundamental differences between France and Britain 
on how peace was to be achieved and maintained appeared 
almost immediately after the war. Winston Churchill com-
mented that "the war is over. I mean the period of joint 
united effort for common purpose. It will never recur. 
Now we are fighting each other again." 6 Throughout the 
Conference, Anglo-French differences had an influence on 
most decisions. 
On January 18, 1919, the Paris Peace Conference 
was formally opened. The work of the Conference progressed 
slowly for more than two months before the Big Four settled 
down to closed sessions to hammer out the most difficult 
aspects of the treaty. On January 25, the Conference 
adopted a resolution for the creation of a League of 
Nations. The drafting of the League Constitution and drafts 
the Peace 
Gollancz, 
5L.S. Amery, War and Peace, 
6
Lord R idde 11 , ==L'=o~r-=dc....:cRo.=ic;d,_,d=,e,-=l::.cl=-c-:' sc-=-'I=n:,:,t,=im=a'-"t-=e-==D:.=i:.;ar:;:...,yc.....::o=f 
Conference and After 1 18-1 2 (London: Victor 
Lt., 1933 , p,15, 
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on economics, territorial. questions, disarmament, and 
reparations were sent to committees of "experts." 
Germany and Russia were excluded from peacemak-
ing, but nevertheless, developments within each country 
inf'luenced the outcome of the Paris Peace Conf'erence. It 
was Lloyd George who pressed the conf'erence to make a 
decision of Russian policy and Russian representation. He 
urged the Conf'erence "to decide whether to withdraw the.ir 
troops or to reinf'orce them," and said that the conf'erence 
should be prepared to accept the Bolsheviks if they repre-
sented the prevalent opinion in Russia. 7 'rhe Delegation 
agreed to meet the representatives of the various Russian 
governments away from Paris, 8 as Clemenceau was opposed to 
inviting the Bolsheviks to Paris, much less talking to 
them. 9 So a compromise was reached and Wilson draf'ted the 
"Prinkipo Summons," an invitation to Russia to meet at the 
Princes Islands, Sea of Marmora, by February 15, 1919, 10 
The purpose of the meeting was to help "to bring Russia 
peace and an opportunity to find her way out of her present 
7u.S.Department of State, Papers Relating to the 
Forei Relations of the United States, "The Paris Peace 
Conf'erence" Washington1 U.S.Printing 0ffice,194-1-194-7), III, 
pp. 4-90-4-91 . 
8 Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference, I, 
pp. 229-232, 
p.226. 
9Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference, I, 




The proposed conf'erence was a failure. There was 
a good deal of opposition from Winston Churchill and the 
rightest forces who wanted armed intervention. Lloyd George 
defended his policy in the Commons on February 12, 1919, by 
saying he had no intention of recognizing the Bolshevik 
Government. But he cautioned the members to consider that 
"America will send neither men, money, nor material, and, 
therefore, it practically falls upon France and ourselves. 
Has anyone calculated the cost?"12 On this matter, Arno 
Mayer declares that "instead of providing strong leadership, 
Lloyd George vacillated and hedged,"iJ Yes, Lloyd George 
"hedged," but his stand on intervention did.not. Later 
Winston Churchill confesses to Lloyd George: "You have 
gone on consistently, never varying, but always with the 
same fixed idea."14 Nevertheless, the Prinkipo Summons 
failed to bring an end to strife in Russia. 
When the active discussions on Russia subsided, 
discussion about the French search for security dominated 
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the remainder of the Conference, either in the form of 
territorial concessions, disarmament, treaties of guarantee, 
reparations or economic restrictions. The fear of Germany 
again becoming powerful in the future controlled French 
actions. And Lloyd George did appreciate the French de-
sire for security within relevant boundaries. 
The Allies'claims for reparations and the attempts 
to include demands for the entire cost of the war proved to 
be a very disruptive matter. Making Germany pay for the 
war was also one of the most politically sensitive topics 
of the peacemakers. Arnold Toynbee declared, "the Repara-
tion Chapter in the Treaty of Versailles at once the 
most important and at once the least conclusive piece of 
work the Peace Conference left behind."15 As it turned 
out, reparations became the most important topic of the 
post-Conference diplomacy. 
A special commission to study reparation was 
established January 23, 1919, The duties of this Committee, 
whose creation was born in a resolution submitted to the 
Council of Ten by Lloyd George, were to determine evaluation 
of reparations, the capacity of Germany to pay, and guar-
antees to insure the fulfillment of economic obligations. 
Progress on reparations through March 1919 was very slow 
15Arnold J.Toynbee, The World After the Peace Con-
ference (London1 Oxford Press, 1930), p.3. 
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and indecisive. The Americans, at this point, refused to 
yield their position that it was impossible to demand Ger-
man payment of the full war costs since this had not been 
spelled out in the Lansing Note or the Armistice to which 
Germany agreed to enter peace negotiations. 
Wilson believed that a precise reparation figure 
should be written into the Treaty. Lloyd George was uncom-
fortably aware that Bonar Law and other Unionists took the 
same view, but with the aid of Clemenceau and Orlando he 
persuaded the President to give way. Wilson then took his 
stand on the i_ssue that, whatever sum the Reparations Com-
mission decided upon, the payments should not be extended 
over any longer period than thirty years. If Germany were 
able to pay off the full sum during that period, all well 
and good; if not, she ought to pay the most that she could 
and the League of Nations would be asked to confirm that 
she was paying to the limit of her capacity. Clemenceau 
and Orlando were strongly opposed to this; Clemenceau de-
clared that the sum ought to be paid in full even if it 
took a thousand years to do so. Lloyd George supported 
Wilson, who threatened to return home if the French remained 
intransigent, and Clemenceau eventually gave way. 16 
At this point, the House of Commons was becoming 
quite vocal about whether or not Lloyd George intended to 
16Peter Rowland, Lloyd George, pp.487-491, 
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carry out his election promises. So under the circumstances 
it is not surprising that in response to the question of 
whether he would press for reparations and make Germany pay 
to the fullest extent the cost of the war, Lloyd George 
responded on February 12, 1919: "This is the election 
pledge I gave after very careful consideration by the Cabi-
net. The government stands by every word of that pledge."1 7 
So the Prime Minister gave in on the question of including 
war costs in the Reparation bill, and did so, under the 
pressure of public opinion. Thus, Lloyd George committed 
himself in London to a policy which greatly handicapped him 
in Paris. After Britain had given up her demands for war 
costs, Lloyd George stated in a more moderate fashion that 
he "was definitely of the opinion that we were by the 
Armistice terms not to demand an indemnity which would in-
elude the cost of prosecuting the war .. ,,18 
The crucial question pertained to the amount of 
reparations that the Allies would ask of Germany. And 
quite apart from the difficulty in reaching agreement on 
what it was that Germany was supposed to be paying for was 
the problem of ascertaining what the sum actually amounted 
to; and in addition to the issue of how the spoils were to 
17The Times, February 1J, 1919, 
18Thomas Jones, 
University Press, 1951), 
Lloyd George, (Cambridge: Harvard 
p,172. 
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be divided, there was the problem of wheth~r Germany would 
be able to pay very much at all. At the present time her 
industries were in ruin and her people were starving. Lloyd 
George had endeavored in his election speeches to warn his 
audiences that Germany's capacity to pay might be limited, 
but he was sadly aware that the majority of his listeners 
felt otherwise. 19 
An estimate of the damage done, the cost of 
restoration, and the evaluation of Germany's capacity to 
pay would take months. And the Conference was deadlocked 
on all of these questions. Charles Seymour of the American 
Delegation wrote that "the important thing, seeing that 
Germany has only so much she can pay, was to find out how 
much that is and then decide how it is to be distributed," 20 
It was no easy task however to decide how much 
Germany could pay, much less to come to an agreement as to 
the distribution of any reparations received. British esti-
mates ranged from a low of~ J,000 million suggested by 
J.M. Keynes to the~ 12-24,000 million of Lord Sumner and 
Lord Cunliffe. 21 The French felt that Germany was capable 
19Peter Rowland, Lloyd George, p.488. 
20 Charles Seymour, Letters From the Peace Con-
ference, p,171, 
21 J.M. Keynes, Activities and Associated Writings, 
XVI, pp,JJ6-J8J, and Lloyd George, The Truth About Repar-
ation, pp,11-13, 
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of~ 30,000 million, although they were generally quite 
reluctant to commit themselves to a definite claim. Lord 
Sumner said, "France does not know what her reparation and 
damage claim is and obviously is most unwilling to risk an 
estimate or a statistical computation." 22 
There was great concern within the Cabinet that 
Great Britain and especially the Dominions would be ex-
cluded from reparations. Germany's reserves and ability to 
· pay would be exhausted and thus prevent the British Empire 
from receiving any payments from Germany. Lloyd George 
pointed out to his Cabinet that it was important to deter-
mine how much Germany could pay, and even if it took a long 
time to decide on the distribution of the amount, it was 
important "that we should make peace soon in order that 
trade might be restored." 23 
The domestic political pressure on all the major 
representatives at Paris was real and constant. Bonar Law 
did speak in moderation about Lloyd George and the election 
pledges, but by April there was a movement underway to 
recall Lloyd George from Paris to remind him of his election 
pledges. 
Meanwhile, the Paris Peace Conference dragged on 
and in March, after nearly three months, no hope of conclu-
I, 
22Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference, 
p.332. 
23CAB 23, WC 536, February 25, 1919, 
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sion was in sight. After a meeting of Lloyd George, 
Woodrow Wilson and French Premier Georges Clemenceau on 
March 20, 1919, Colonel House approached Clemenceau to ask 
him what had taken place during the meeting and how they 
got along. Clemenceau replied, "Splendidly, we disagreed 
about everything. n 24 Sir Maurice Hankey, one of Lloyd 
George's close companions, also lamented over the fate of 
the Conference and Germanys he felt that the economic and 
financial condition would "be our bottleneck," He also 
worried that the election promises would cause many prob-
lems in peacemaking. And he also believed that reparations 
was a very difficult g_uestion. He said that "it is out-
rageous and intolerable that Germany should not pay, and 
yet, if she is made to pay, we may raise such a danger as 
may overwhelm civilization itself. n 25 And Hankey was 
correct on virtually all points. 
General Smuts was certain that the Conference had 
lost direction and "was taking a bad turn. "26 Actually, 
Smuts did not believe the Conference had much sense of 
direction in the first place: "the treaty began to take 
24w.M.Jordan, Great Britain, France and the Ger-
man Problem 1918-1939 (Londons Oxford University Press, 
1943), pp. 32-33, 
25Thomas Jones, Whitehall, p.81. 
26 W.K. Hancock, Smuts, I, p.509. 
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shape in bits and pieces, without any central focus ... "27 
Even Lloyd George confided to Lord Riddell that "the Con-
ference is not going well," 28 And Philip Kerr and Sir 
Maurice Hankey advised the Prime Minister of the "uneasi-
ness" about the direction of the Conference. 29 
On March 21, Lloyd George asked a few of his key 
advisors to retire with him to Fontainebleau for the week-
end of March 22-24 in order to reassess England's and the 
Empire's position. Sir Henry Wilson, Sir Maurice Hankey and 
Philip Kerr were chosen to reconsider aims and objectives 
of the Peace Conference. This was definitely an attempt to 
get the Conference back on the right track. Frances 
Stevenson, Lloyd George's personal secretary, wrote in her 
diary on that day: "He is determined, too, to take the 
bull by the horns and to force decisions on the vital points 
during the coming week,"JO She went on to say that "when 
he withdraws from the world in that way for 24 hours, some-
thing is bound to happen."3l On the following day, under 
Lloyd George's guidance, Kerr started drafting what became 
pp.36-37, 
27w.K. Hancock, Smuts, I, p.509. 
28Lord Riddell, Lord Riddell's Intimate Diary, 
29Arno Mayer, Peacemaking, pp,518-519, 
3°Frances Stevenson, Lloyd George, p,175, 
31Frances Stevenson, Lloyd George, p.175. 
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known as the Fontainebleau Memorandum, the final version 
which bore the date March 25, 1919, It was in two parts, 
the first section setting out "Some considerations for the 
Peace Conference before they draft their final terms" and 
the second section summarizing the type of settlement that 
the British wanted to see. 32 The Fontainebleau Memorandum 
was a tactical and strategic move designed to bring the 
British and Americans closer together in an attempt to block 
the French; to show labor in Britain that a bit of Liberal-
ism still survived in Lloyd George; to stop the drive of 
Bolshevism into Europe; and to express Lloyd George's own 
inner beliefs about the future of Europe and the need for 
a peace which Germany could live with. General Smuts wrote 
that Lloyd George "appears even prepared to face the situ-
ation and go under if necessary."33 Frances Stevenson said 
that "He is taking the long view about the Peace, and insists 
that it should be one that will not leave bitterness for 
years to come,, ... 34 
Lloyd George emphasized, in the first section of 
the memorandum, that any attempts to maintain the ·pe·ace by 
keeping Germany in a permanent state of weakness were bound 
to fail: 
32Peter Rowland, Lloyd George, pp,484-486; 
33 W.K.Hancock, Smuts, I, p,513, 
34Frances Stevenson, Lloyd George, p.175, 
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You may strip Germany of her colonies, reduce her 
armaments to a mere police force and her navy to that 
of a fifth-rate power; all the same, in the end if she 
feels that she has been unjustly treated in the peace 
of 1919 she will find means of exacting retribution 
from her conquerors ... The proposal of the Polish 
commission that we should place 2,100,000 Germans un-
der the control of a people which is of a different 
religion and which has never proved its capacity for 
stable self-government throughout its history must 
lead sooner or later to a new war in the East of Eur-
ope. Secondly, I would say that the duration for 
payments of reparation ought to disappear if
5
possible 
with the new generation which made the war.3 
The possibility that Germany might throw in her 
lot with the Bolsheviks, rather than submit to a humilia-
ting peace, was underlined; the memorandum went on to 
emphasize the desirability of the members of the League of 
Nations to undertake to limit their own armaments as well 
as those of Germany: 
If the League is to do its work for the world it 
will only be because the members of the League trust 
it themselves and because there are no rivalries and 
jealousies in the matter of armaments between them.JS 
The second half of the memorandum envisaged an 
agreement by the principal members of the League to end com-
petition in armaments. The Rhenish provinces would remain 
part of Germany but would be demilitarized. France would 
be compensated for this by a guarantee of assistance from 
the British Empire and the United States which would remain 
35Peter Rowland, Lloyd George, p.485, 
36Peter Rowland, Lloyd George, p.485. 
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in force until the League provided adequate security. 
France would also be compensated by the return of Alsace-
Lorraine together with either the Saar Valley or compen-
sation for the destruction of her coal mines. Poland would 
be given a corridor to Danzig which would embrace the 
smallest possible number of Germans. Germany would under-
take to pay full reparations and a tentative scheme would 
be devised for settling the precise amount and determining 
the method of payment.37 
The Fontainebleau Memorandum was an attempt to 
create a firm and just outline for peace. Lloyd George 
covered termination of war, the League of Nations, political 
boundaries, disarmament, reparation, punishment of war 
criminals and economics. The historian, Richard Ullman, 
describes the nature of Lloyd George's effort by saying 
that "neither within his own government nor within those of 
its allies were there leaders who were willing to expend 
their political capital to achieve the same outcome ... 38 
Wilson and Clemenceau were presented with copies 
of this memorandum. The President was broadly in sympathy 
with its objectives, but Clemenceau was not at all impressed. 
37Peter Rowland, Lloyd George, pp.485-486. 
38Richard H.Ullman, The Anglo-Soviet Accord, Vol. 
III, Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917-1921 (Princeton1 Princeton 
University Press, 1972), p.459, 
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He made it clear that France had no desire whatsoever to be 
kind to Germany or to apologize for having won the war. 
France wanted full payment for past misdemeanors and posi-
tive guarantees against their repetition in the future. 39 
Clemenceau delivered his reply. He was still con-
cerned about gaining permanent advantage over Germany and 
warned of "sparing the vanquished at the expense of the 
victors."4° Clemenceau also complained to Lloyd George that 
"If you don't give me what I want, I can't meet my people, 
I shall have to resign. ,. 4l 
Thus, with the memorandum, the British position 
became clear and the divergence between.the British and the 
French position more apparent. The British sought the eco-
nomic restoration of Germany and Europe as a means to peace 
and as a means to stopping the spread of Bolshevism, while 
the French believed that a weak Germany and a strong France 
would insure peace in Europe. 
The Fontainebleau Memorandum did not in itself 
quicken the progress at the Paris Peace Conference; however, 
it did provide for a measure of test of Lloyd George's 
strength in Parliament. The House of Commons wanted to 
39Peter Rowland, Lloyd George, p.486. 
40Arno Mayer, Peacemaking, p,595. 
41Paul Birdsall, Versailles Twenty Years After 
(New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1941), p.187. 
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ascertain whether or not Lloyd George was going to stand by 
his election pledges or not. 
Lloyd George was now going to have to answer to 
the Conservative majority and he readily realized the dis-
advantage of his alliance with them. Two hundred and 
thirty-three Unionist M,P.'s, greatly perturbed by the 
reports of the Conference appearing in the press, sent Lloyd 
George a telegram on April 8. The telegram began by saying 
that rather than ask for the complete cost of the war the 
British delegation was considering only what could be ex-
acted from the enemy•, The telegram went on to say that "our 
constituents have always expected and still expect 
that the first action of the Peace Delegates would be to 
present the Bill in full,,." And the telegram ended by 
asking for assurance that the British Delegation had in no 
way departed from its original intention. 42 Lloyd George 
immediately replied to the telegram that he "stood faith-
fully by all his pledges"43and said that he would return 
to the House of Commons to speak in his own defense. 
On April 16, 1919 Lloyd George delivered before 
the Commons a summary of the problems and progress of the 
peace conference. He claimed that his pledges, as well as 
42Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference, 
I, pp,374-375. 
43Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference, 
I, p.375, 
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those of almost every other politician, contained declara-
tions about how Germany should be punished. His own 
pledges were not made in mere haste; had he not talked of 
reparation and compensation for service men a few days be-
fore President Wilson delivered his "Fourteen Points?" 
Lloyd George even challenged any newspaper to publish the 
forthcoming peace terms in parallel columns with the 
pledges made by the government. No newspaper ever accepted 
the challenge. 44 He ended his defense with an appeal for 
world peace and an appeal " ... not to soil his triumph of 
right by indulging in the anger passions of the moment, 
but to consecrate the sacrifices of millions to the per-
manent redemption of the human race from the scourge and 
agony of war . "4 5 
The conclusion one might draw from the reception 
of Lloyd George's speech in Parliament is that the three 
hundred and seventy members who endorsed the recall of 
Lloyd George were not committed to a major change in direc-
tion of his work at Paris and that the election pledges 
made by Lloyd George were not as great a burden as is usu-
ally portrayed. Lloyd George says the "opposition 
44Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference, 
I, pp.380-381. 
45Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference, 
I, p.383. 
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collapsed utterly, "46 
To place in proper perspective the events of 
Lloyd George's recall to the House of Commons and his re-
sulting'speech, one must keep in mind the breakthroughs in 
negotiations made during the first two weeks of April, 
During those weeks Lloyd George, Wilson, and Clemenceau 
were able to reach agreement on most of the points of con-
cern to the radical Conservatives. The idea of presenting 
a bill to Germany for strictly reparations was dropped, 
Moreover, Lloyd George had also abandoned the idea of fix-
ing a time period on the reparation, so that, for example, 
Britain might collect what she could within thirty years, 
but then be able to collect no more. The fixing of the 
amount as well as the time in which to pay it was to be 
left to the Reparations Commission. Lloyd George also 
agreed to the occupation of the Rhineland and French control 
of the Saar for fifteen years, 47 
Another significant development was that the by-
elections of April 11, 1919, indicated that the public was 
changing its attitude toward Germany at least in regard 
to peace terms. British public opinion was finally turning 
46Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference, 
I, p.383. 
47Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference, 
I, pp,375-384. 
toward a more moderate attitude, It was becoming more 
obvious that the public had not viewed the policy of moder-
ation which Lloyd George was trying to follow as severely 
as did the Parliament. As one observer put it, "the great 
masses of people in this country are thoroughly tired of the 
war."48 The anti-German hysteria of the Election of 1918 
in December had subsided. The public as well as the 
Commons was coming around more and more to Lloyd George's 
moderate position. His opposition was really never silenced, 
but having appeased them somewhat by his moves of the late 
winter and spring, having seen his policy at least indirec-
tly vindicated at the polls during the by-election held on 
April 11, 1919, and having triumphed on the floor of the 
Commons on April 16, he could be reasonably sure that if he 
made no large mistakes, there would be no further serious 
challenge of his authority, 
Therefore, the election pledges had brought Lloyd 
George back to London to face a hostile Parliament. How-
ever, it does not seem that he was totally bound by these 
pledges at the Paris Peace Conference. Thomas Jones be-
lieves that Lloyd George's actions in Paris "were governed" 
by his election pledges and that he "usually, but not always, 
48Reginald Viscount Esher, The Captains and the 
Kin s·De art: Journals and Letters of Reinald Viscount 
Esher, ed., Oliver Viscount Esher New York: Charles 
Scribner and Sons, 1938), p.228, 
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tried to interpret them in Germany's favor," but that the 
pressure from the press and Parliament "made it difficult 
for him to follow the dictates of his intelligence,"49 
Examples of how Lloyd George· protected himself on various 
issues can be found throughout the conference, General 
Smuts, in a letter to Lloyd George, reiterated that Lloyd 
George had earlier said that unless representatives of the 
British Empire were unanimous on the question of reparations, 
as well as other peace terms, that he would have to support 
the "whole hoggers" and that might mean that no peace at 
all would be signed,50 Therefore, the degree to which 
Lloyd George was affected by the election pledges and the 
degree to which he responded to political pressures became 
very important. 
Having quelled the opposition at home, ~loyd 
George was able to operate more freely in accordance with 
his own more moderate aims, insofar as he had not had to 
tie his hands to win this freedom. Lloyd George had always 
felt that the restoration of the German economy was vital 
to the restoration of Great Britain's own economy. Some-
thing now had to be done to prevent the imminent economic 
destruction of Europe. Lloyd George also had doubts about 
49Thomas Jones,· Lloyd George, p.172. 
50w.K.Hancock and J.Van Der Poel, eds.Selections 
From the Smuts Papers (London1 Cambridge University Press, 
1966), IV, Letter 937, pp,120-121, 
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Germany losing Upper Silesia to Poland, paying the large 
reparation, and being burdened with the war guilt clause, 
In these matters, Lloyd George did not stand alone. The 
South African.delegation was also skeptical of the prac-
ticality of the reparations clauses. General Smuts said 
that "mad people still believe the British industry will 
profit from the industrial annihilation of Germany,,,51 
The Germans arrived at Versailles but were obli-
ged to wait while the treaty was put into final form under 
the general supervision of Lloyd George, Wilson and 
Clemenceau. They had been working in close association 
with one another for almost four months by this time, and 
despite a basic rapport, their relationship was strained.52 
The Treaty, assembled in a great hurry and based 
on many undiscussed and unamended findings of the varioµs 
commissions, was formally presented to the German repre-
sentatives at the Trianon Palace at Versailles on May 7, 
1919, The Germans were given fifteen days in which to 
study it. Lloyd George and many of his colleagues were 
appalled at the punitive nature of the terms. It was 
generally agreed that the terms were so humiliating that 
Germany would be quite justified in refusing to accept them 
51w.K. Hancock, Selections From Smuts, IV, Letter 
951, p,140. 
52Peter Rowland, Lloyd George, p,492, 
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and Lloyd George was empowered to go back to the Council 
of' Four and press f'or modifications - and to employ, more-
over, the threat that Britain would otherwise refuse to 
renew the war or take part in the blockade of' Germany, if' 
the terms were rejected.53 
The Germans did object strongly to the Treaty, 
and especially to the war guilt clauses which pinned f'ull 
responsibility on them f'or having started the war. The 
German observations on the Draft Treaty were received on 
May 29, 1919, The German government made detailed counter-
proposals to the Reparations Articles, they were prepared 
to pay up to a maximum sum of' one hundred billion gold 
marks, twenty billion on May 1, 1926, and the remainder 
interest-free in annual payments to be set at a later date.54 
Lloyd George examined the German Delegation's 
response on May 29, 1919, with the intention of' giving the 
uppermost consideration to those appeals which sought to 
alter the main clauses of' the treaty. The Prime Minister 
still believed that a f'ixed sum would be best and that the 
Germans should be given time to assess the damage and to 
submit a f'ixed sum f'or reparation based on Germany's capa-
53Peter Rowland, Lloyd George, p.493. 
54Alma Luckau, The German Delegation at the Paris 
PeaceConf'erence (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1941), Document 57, pp.J02-J06. 
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city to pay. 55 
Lloyd George called for all the British Ministers 
and Dominion Premiers to meet on June 1, 1919, to consider 
modification of the Draft Treaty. The meeting resulted in 
the preparation of a list of proposed modifications1 
clauses dealing with the Eastern frontiers; the date of 
German entry into the League of Nations; the clause deal-
ing with the army of occupation; and most importantly, the 
reparation clauses. These modifications could be carried 
out by either of two methods. Either Germany could under-
take the whole task of restoration, plus the paying of a 
fixed sum to be divided among the Allies, or else she 
could sign the Reparation Clauses as they stood and within 
three months make an offer in cash and kind to settle her 
entire liability. 56 So the British government had come to 
realize that the Economic Clauses were too severe and that 
they "risked not getting anything from Germany by asking 
too much, ,, 57 
Lloyd George felt the British delegation had to 
stand by its proposed modifications "even if it were neces-
55Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference, 
I, pp.459-461. 
56Arno Mayer, Peacemaking, pp,797-800, 
57charles Seymour, Letters From the Peace Con-
ference, p.256. 
58 The French sary to withold our· signature to the treaty." 
were visibly upset. Their position remained that they had 
been attacked and they were victorious; therefore, they 
would cede nothing to Germany. Lloyd George's proposals 
seemed to be whittled away one by one by French opposition. 
Andre Tardieu has said that "after a few hard words - face 
to face the distance between 
grew less and that of the French 
the two points of 
made headway. "59 
view 
On June 28, 1919, the Treaty of Versailles was 
signed. Explicit provisions which would have made Germany 
pay the whole cost of the war were not incorporated into the 
final treaty. Instead, Germany accepted general responsibi-
lity for", .. causing all the loss and damage to which the 
Allied and Associated governments and their nationals have 
been subjected ... "60 A fixed reparation sum could not be 
arrived at, so a commission was established to study the 
amount of damage for which compensation would be due from 
Germany, as well as the method and means by which payment 
was to be made, The Commission was to make its decision 
on or by May 1, 1921. 
58Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference, 
I, p.481. 
59Andre Tardieu, The Truth About the Treaty 
( Indianapolis : Bob bs-Merr i1"='1.:.:, c::..,-1 ='92=-1:"r) "", -=p""'p"-'.::..;1'"=1--=5'°"-"'1'-:-1-=9-=-. =.::,_,i_ 
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At the Paris Peace Conference, Lloyd George had 
been subjected to many pressures: an aroused public de-
manding payment for war costs and the punishment of war 
criminals; and a House of Commons basically imperialistic 
in outlook also demanded severe treatment of Germany. 61 
Nevertheless, the Prime Minister still tried to carry out 
the more moderate principles that Germany had to pay for 
the damage she had caused up to her capacity to pay and 
that Great Britain had to be willing to limit her demands 
to the level of what could be paid without injury to British 
t d d . d t 62 ra e an in us ry. 
Lord Curzon was one whose views reflected this 
trend. He believed that it would be most difficult to say 
what Germany would be able to pay in the next thirty years. 
The Treaty of Versailles had secured for Great Britain and 
her Allies full reparation, and in view of the economic 
uncertainty of the future, a modification of the terms of 
the treaty to meet the needs of the situation would be 
possible at any time. 63 The British appeared willing to 
follow a very flexible policy toward fulfillment of the 
treaty by the Germans. The economic recovery of Germany 
61 Charles Seymour, Letters From the Peace Con-
ference, p.256. 
62
David Lloyd George, The Truth About Reparations 
63The Times, July 4, 1919, p.8. 
was essential to the European economic system and to the 
economic health of Great Britain. 
63 
Lloyd George returned to London and was welcomed 
at Victoria Station by King George V, the Prince of Wales, 
and an enthusiastic crowd. Lloyd George then delivered a 
speech to an awaiting crowd as being "charged with hope," 
and for the British people to "rejoice in this great vie-
Five weeks later Lloyd George was presented t ,.64 ory ... 
with the Order of Merit in recognition of his pre-eminent 
services "both in carrying out the war to a victorious 
end and in securing an honorable peace." 65 It was, perhaps, 
as honorable a peace as circumstances would permit, but 
there were many things wrong with it and Lloyd George was 
under no illusions about the permanence of the settlement. 
"We shall have to do the whole thing over again in twenty-
five years," he glumly remarked, "at three times the 
cost. "66 
The treaty was ratified by the House of Commons 
on July 21, 1919, There were only four dissenting votes. 
Of those four, three were Home Rulers protesting the lack 
of any provisions for Irish Home Rule, and the other was 
64
The Times, June 30, 1919, p.14. 
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61.J-
that of a Radical recently elected. 67 
Although the treaty had been unanimously approved 
by the House of Commons, this did not represent the true 
feelings of the British people. Opposition to the treaty 
was growing throughout Britain and on June 5, 1919, the 
Labour Party called the treaty a "violation of the under-
standing upon which the armistice was signed," and that a 
"reparation of five billion pounds would be satisfactory." 68 
Earlier, discontent with the peace proposal had 
been growing within the British delegation at the Peace 
Conference, John Maynard Keynes was quite disillusioned 
by the Conference and the proposed treaty. Keynes was 
deputy for the Chancellor of the Exchequer and principal 
representative of the British Treasury at the Peace Con-
ference. The important thing to Keynes had been for Britain 
and her Allies to work for world peace and "to establish 
world affairs on a new and better basis, so that this 
shall not happen again. May no other generation live under 
the cloud we live under." 69 
At Paris, Keynes thought he had his chance to 
pursue peace, but he was not even appointed to the Repara-
(New 
67A.J.P. ·Taylor, English History, pp,135-136. 
68The Times, June 16, 1919, p,13, 
69R.F'. Harrod, The Life of John Maynard Keynes 
York: St.Martin's Press, 1966), p,215, 
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tions Commission. Unfortunately for Keynes, his great 
ability as an economist was still basically unknown to all 
but a few, and he was only occasionally consulted by Lloyd 
George. Keynes wrote to his mother; "the Peace is out-
rageous and impossible and can bring nothing but misfortune 
behind it ... ,. 7o He was upset by the "morbid" 71 atmosphere 
at Paris, so he resigned on June 7, 1919, In December, 
1919, he published The Economic Consequences of the Peace. 
Keynes argued that Europe could prosper only when Germany 
was restored to her old economic strength, and he blamed 
the peacemakers for all the sufferings which the Germans 
had brought on themselves, and on Europe, not only by being 
defeated but from having waged war at all. 
As to the amount of reparation Germany could pay, 
Keynes estimated two billion pounds would be a safe figure 
based on pre-war productivity and potential levels of pro-
duction after the war. Keynes believed that the peace-
makers did not realize that the most serious problems "were 
not political ·or territorial but financial and economic." 72 
Keynes concluded that the Treaty of Versailles could not 
stand unless there was a general revision of the treaty and 
70R.F.Harrod, Life of Keynes, p.229, 
71Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, p.77. 
72J.M.Keynes, Economic Consequences, p,1¼6. 
66 
a settlement of inter-Allied debts. 73 
After the signing of the treaty, the British 
Government stated its policy toward Germany. The Treaty 
of Versailles would be upheld and justified, but it would 
also be subject to modification in a more moderate direc-
tion. There were few people in 1919 who actually believed 
that the Paris Peace Conference and the Treaty of Versailles 
would bring a lasting peace to Europe. Each of the great 
powers differed in its interpretation of the document and 
began to pursue widely divergent policies. This resulted 
in a series of Conferences among the concerned powers 
during the years of 1919-1922, 
?JJ,M. Keynes, Economic Consequences, p.256. 
Chapter 5 
POST-PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE ERA 
From 1919 to 1922, there were numerous inter-
national conferences convened to deal with post-war 
problems of economics, Germany, reparation, disarmament 
and treaty enforcement in general, If there was one indi-
vidual responsible for this series of conferences, it was 
Lloyd George. Diplomacy by conferences was of utmost 
importance to him, and he deemed conferences of Premiers 
the best means of expediting the work of diplomacy; as a 
result, there were twenty-three major conferences convened 
during the last three years of Lloyd George's administra-
tion, 1920-1922, 1 
During 1920-1922, Lloyd George attended conference 
after conference. Some of them were useful; others were 
failures. It may be noted that during this period, the 
Middle East situation was sorted out at an early stage, 
with France receiving a mandate for Syria and Britain re-
ceiving mandates for Palestine and Mesopotamia; the Dutch 
Government steadfastly refused to hand over the ex-Kaiser to 
the Allies and America refused to ratify the Versailles 
Treaty. Discussions were taking place during the early 
1Charles Mowat, Britain Between the Wars, pp,112-119, 
68 
part of 1920 concerning the Turkish treaty. There was grow-
ing public opinion against the Versailles Treaty in Britain, 
and throughout the world. And the possibility of a general 
Bolshevik revolution across Germany was at hand. Lloyd 
George was deeply concerned about the welfare of Germany, 
but he was also quite worried about maintaining a united 
front with France. 
It would be an involved and detailed undertaking 
to analyze each international conference during the period 
1919-1922. This study therefore limits its attention to 
select representative conferences. These conferences reflect 
the theme of the French drive for security and the British 
determination to restore Europe to her former economic 
prosperity which had been interpreted as being fundamental 
to a peaceful world. Each of these broad problems were 
multifaceted as well. The economic question developed 
around the collection of German reparations and inter-Allied 
debts. The Allied debt problem was made especialy difficult 
by the withdrawal of the United States, the primary credi-
tor of the Allies, from Europe and herabsolute refusal to 
make any deals on alleviating the burden of Europe's debt. 
The first seven months of 1920 saw Lloyd George's 
diplomacy by conference put to a severe test. The year 
opened with conferences at Paris and London. Other con-
ferences followed in rapid succession in an attempt to solve 
Europe's problems as well as seeing that Germany complied 
with the terms of the peace settlement. But, first of all, 
Lloyd George's efforts to seek relatively moderate treat-
ment of Germany were always hampered by internal problems 
within Germany. And secondly, the great dilemma for Lloyd 
George was whether the interests of peace were best served 
by pressing his policy of reconciliation on economic matters 
and perhaps destroying the possibility of good relations 
with France or if peace was best served only be protesting 
and then letting France pursue her Rhineland strategy. 
Therefore, from 1920-1922, Lloyd George caused many con-
ferences to be convened and often dominated their proceed-
ings. 
The period from January 1920 to May 1921 was one 
of many conferences held to implement the collection of 
one billion pounds reparation due by May 1, 1921; of 
trying to arrive at a fixed sum of liability; and of at-
tempting to bridge an ever-widening gap between the British 
and the French relations. 
A Prime Ministers' conference was held at San 
Remo, Italy, April 18-26, 1920. At this conference, Lloyd 
George clearly stated the British position regarding the 
use of force in enforcing the terms of the treaty. Lloyd 
George believed that the occupation of any German territory 
was a most unsatisfactory way of dealing with the problem 
and would only arouse the military spirit of Germany. "The 
best plan would be to have a straight talk with them and 
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find out what can be done," 2 The present system, advocated 
by the French, of acting unilaterally, using force, and 
dictating terms to the Germans had failed completely. 
The San Remo conference was concerned not only 
with mending the British and French rift but also with the 
impending definition of the extent of German war reparation. 
Lloyd George still believed that if Germany were ever to be 
expected to pay, her.liability must be established. This 
could only be done by way of direct negotiations with the 
German government. 3 Consequently, France would only agree 
to the summoning of a conference with the Germans if the 
"Allies meant to insist on the integral enforcement of the 
treaty, and secondly, as to the action they should take in 
the event of Germany failing to execute it. 4 
Thus, San Remo was the first of many conferences 
called to deal further with the problem of establishing 
German liabilities in the form of a lump sum before the 
Reparations Commission made its decision on May 21, 1921, 
and secondly, of collecting the one billion pounds sterling 
2 Rohan Butler and J.P.T. Bury,, eds., Documents on 
British Forei Polic 1 19-19 (London: Her Majesty's 
Stationary Office, 1958 , VII, Series I, Document 2, p.7. 
VII, 
VII, 
3Rohan Butler, Documents on British Foreign Policy, 
Series I, Document 2, pp,13-17, 
4 
Rohan Butler, Documents on British Foreign Policy, 
Series I, Document 2, p.13. 
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due·from Germany by May 1, 1921, There had been much frank 
talk at the Conference between France and Britain and for 
the present time, much misunderstanding had been removed. 
Commenting in the House of Commons on his work at 
San Remo, Lloyd George said that the Allied complaint was 
"not that Germany had not paid toward the one billion due 
by May 1, 1921; we knew she could not pay." The question 
pertained to the "integral enforcement of the treaty, and 
secondly, as to the action they should take in the event of 
Germany failing to execute it."5 
Meanwhile, two conferences concerning German 
reparation and inter-allied debts were held, the Lympne 
Conference of May 15-17 and the Boulogne Conference of June 
21-22. The preparatory conference at Lympne of May 15-17 
was concerned solely with the question of reparations. In 
' 
an official communique, issued from the conference on May 
16, the question of inter-allied debts was introduced into 
th t . t· 6 e repara ion ques ion. The British government, however, 
did not make any definite commitments on the inter-allied 
debts. The British believed that the sooner the reparation 
question could be settled, the sooner the Allies could talk-
about settling inter-allied debts. The two subjects could 
5Rohan Butler, Documents on British Foreign Policy, 
VII, Series I, Document 2, p.13. 
6A.J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs 
1920-1923 (London: Humphrey Milford, 1925), p,117, 
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and should be treated separately. 7 The French, however, 
believed that inter-allied debts and reparations could not 
be separated. The payment of' her inter-allied debt depended 
directly upon the reparations payments that she received 
from Germany. If' Germany would not pay, then France could 
not be expected to pay her inter-allied debt. 8 The French 
depended heavily upon reparation payments. They had a uni-
que double budget a regular budget that balanced and an 
"extraordinary budget" that was three times as large as the 
regular budget. The "extraordinary budget" covered war 
costs and reconstruction costs. There was no provision for 
receipts in the latter budget except the payment of' repara-
tions by the Germans. 9 The communique did carry notice 
that the French had agreed to prepare "proposals for fixing 
a minimum total for the German debt which will be capable 
of' acceptance by the Allies and at the same time compatible 
with Germany's capacity to pay." 10 The French had agreed 
to fix a definite sum for the reparation due from Germany. 
The Boulogne Conference was held June 21-22, 1920. 
Its primary purpose was to consider Allied counter-proposals 
7sir Andrew McFadyean, Reparation Reviewed (London, 
Ernest Benn Ltd., 1930), p.37. 
8Gordon Wright, France in Modern Times (Chicago, 
Rand McNally, 1966), pp.454-455. 
9Gordon Wright, France in Modern Times, pp.454-455, 
10The Times, May 17, 1920. 
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in case the German offer to be made at the future Spa Con-
ference proved unsatisfactory. It was decided that a 
committee of experts be called to prepare a schedule of 
payments by which Germany would be required to pay each 
year a minimum sum. 11 The counter-proposals on German 
reparation liability drafted by the Allied experts was 
known as the "Boulogne Agreement", Germany was to pay from 
May 1, 1921, for forty-two years, a fixed annuity of three 
billion gold marks per annum increasing to seven billion 
gold marks per annum in 1931 for the remaining thirty-two 
years; the Reparations Commission was to be allowed to 
grant partial postponement of additional payments; and the 
German government was to be allowed to float international 
loans for reparation. 12 
Next, the carefully planned conference on repara-
tions was held--at Spa, Belgium on July 5-16, 1920. This 
conference was originally scheduled to be held on May 25, 
1920, but was changed to the later date because of the 
German elections. The Germans had been invited to take 
part in the Conference, and since there were elections to 
the Reichstag being held, it was felt that to deal with a 
11Rohan Butler, Documents on British Foreign 
Policy, VII, Series I, Documents 26-30, pp.307-331. 
12Rohan Butler, Documents on British Foreign 
Policy, VII, Series I, Document 31 Appendix, pp.337-339. 
government completely uncertain of its future would be 
futile. 13 Thus, there was the postponement of the con-
ference. 
The Spa conference proved to be very important 
for two re_asons: first, Germany was asked to participate 
in a conference with the Allies; and second, the failure of 
Germany to cooperate with the Allies discredited Lloyd 
George's diplomacy and forced him to follow the French. 
At the onset of the Spa Conference, the British 
moderate policy toward German war reparation and the econo-
mic clauses of the treaty was quite clear as opposed to a 
harsh French policy of military occupation. In a speech 
before President Frederich Ebert of Germany, and other 
German government officials, July 1, 1920, Ambassador 
D'Abernon said, "Economic reconstruction is the most imper-
ative need of the world ... Narrow and short-sighted self-
ishness in this regard are altogether foreign to the 
traditions of my country and are no less opposed to the 
policy of His Majesty's government." 14 President Ebert 
replied that he was in comple-te agreement with all that had 
been said. 
lJLord Riddell, Lord Riddell's Intimate Diary, p.191. 
14viscount D'Abernon, Versailles to Ra 
1 221 The Diar -of an Ambassador Garden City: 
Doran and Company, 1929, p.57. 
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The attitude of the Prime Minister and his Foreign 
Secretary, Lord Curzon, at the Spa Conference was one of 
emphasizing the necessity of restoring the economy of 
Germany. 15 The delegated purpose of the Spa Conference was 
to make a final decision on the reparation clauses, espe-
cially the fixing of the final German reparation debt; 
however, the conference from July 5 to July 9 became con-
cerned primarily with the completion of Germany's disarma-
ment. From disarmament, the conference turned to coal 
deliveries by Germany under the reparation clauses, Germany 
had fallen behind on the deliveries. 
The Spa Conference nearly collapsed over the two 
issues of disarmament and coal deliveries, Coal deliveries 
turned out to be the only facet of reparation extensively 
discussed at the conference, The question of cash-and-kind 
reparation was referred to an Allied committee of experts, 
The Allies had yet to complete their estimates of damages; 
nor had the capacity of Germany to pay huge sums yet been 
determined. The meetings of the Allies and Germany were 
often quite stormy, Finally the Allied representatives 
became so disturbed that the conference was suspended on 
July 13, 1920, after the rejection of a German schedule for 
future coal deliveries, It was eventually necessary to 
sign protocols on both subjects, The protocol on disarma-
15viscount D'Abernon, Versailles to Rapallo, p.70. 
ment was signed on July 9, 1920, and the coal protocol on 
July 16, 1920. The protocols did not solve the disarmament 
and coal delivery problem for the Allies, but they did serve 
as temporary solutions; however, the coal protocol would 
expire in six months and the Allies would be faced with the 
problem of coal deliveries, But because of the outbursts by 
the Germans at the conference, it was necessary for Lloyd 
George to support the French demands for a show of force to 
persuade Germany that the Allies meant to enforce the treaty. 
Lloyd George had to agree to tell Germany what to do rather 
than negotiating terms with them, and this was not what 
Lloyd George had intended. 
The reparation issue had been pushed aside by 
the questions concerning disarmament and coal delivery. 
However, an agreement on distribution of reparations was 
arrived at. The reparations were to be divided along the 
following guidelines: British Empire twenty-two per cent, 
France fifty-two per cent, Italy ten per cent, Belgium 
eight per cent, and the remainder to be divided among those 
Allies receiving reparation payments. Yet the crucial 
question of how much Germany owed was still undecided. And 
the French were realizing that reparations, in vast sums, 
would probably not be forthcoming and they dreaded to tell 
their people at home this deduction. 16 
16Gordon Wright, France in Modern Times, pp.454-455. 
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Spa did not decrease Lloyd George's interest in 
diplomacy by conference but for a time his energies were 
needed at home to settle domestic problems. His accomplish-
ments in domestic matters were far greater than his success 
in Europe; but it was these same successes at home that 
alienated much of his Conservative backing which was al-
ready irritated at his conduct of foreign policy. 
Interallied conferences continued throughout 1920_ 
in an effort to solve the German reparation problem. The 
British continued to insist on meeting with Germany in an 
effort to negotiate a reparations settlement, and the French 
consistently produced excuses for refusing to negotiate. 
The basic argument of the French was that Germany continued 
to evade her obligations. 17 
The Brussels Conference, December 16-22, 1920, 
called as a result of the failure of the Spa Conference, 
was the last Allied attempt during 1920 to arrive at a 
settlement of the reparation question. There was an ob-
vious difference in atmosphere at this conference. Instead 
of the politicians that were present at Spa, the German 
delegation was represented by Dr.Carl Bergmann, an expert 
German financial economist and German State Secretary of 
17Erich Eych, A Histor of the Weimar Re ublic; 
Translated by Harlan Hanson and Robert Waite Cambridge1 
Harvard University Press, 1963), Vol.I. 
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the Ministry of France. There were no stormy arguments at 
the conference such as had occurred at Spa. It looked as 
though real progress toward a viable solution of the 
reparation question might now be worked out. The confer-
ence adjourned for the holidays; this adjournment also 
allowed time for the Germans to prepare a report on their 
finances concerning their ability to pay reparations. The 
Conference reconvened in Paris on January 24, 1921,and ran 
through January JO, 1921, 
The Germans submitted their report at the re-
convening of the Conference. It stated that German 
finances could not be put upon a sound basis until Germany 
could be informed of her whole liability. In the report 
there was a suggestion that the fixation of the German 
capital debt be postponed for five years and one hundred 
fifty thousand pounds be paid annually during those years. 18 
France could not agree to these terms, and unfortunately, 
the hope that conclusions regarding reparations could be 
reached at this phase of the conference ended. The atmos-
phere of the whole conference changed. The Supreme Council 
had decided to add disarmaments to the agenda, "the experts 
began to run away from their own conclusions, and the repara-
18Harold Nicolson, 
1 2 A Stud in Post-War Di 
Company, 193 pp.230-231, 
The Last Phase 1 1 -
London1 Constable and 
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tion question once again became a political issue," 19 as it 
had been throughout the greater part of the period. 
At the first meeting of the Supreme Council in 
Paris in January, 1921, the French put forward a reparation 
claim of five and one-half billion pounds and a total German 
liability of ten billion pounds. 20 Lloyd George contended 
that the "French would not face facts and persisted in 
saying that Germany must pay so much in cash without indi-
cating how the payment could be made without ruining French 
trade," 21 The Supreme Allied Council therefore announced 
the so-called Paris Resolutions of January 29, 1921, The 
Germans did not have to accept the Paris Resolutions as this 
action was actually a breach of the promise made at Spa 
that reparation would be discussed with Germany at a con-
f . G 22 erence in eneva. 
During the next few months, there occurred a 
counter-proposal by Germany which proved unacceptable, 
followed by an ultimatum delivered to Germany on March 3, 
1921, demanding that Germany unconditionally accept the 
p. 126. 
(London1 
19A.J. Toynbee, Survey of International Relations, 
20Harold Nicolson, Curzon, p.231. 
21Lord Riddell, Lord Riddell's Intimate Diary, 
22carl Bergmann, The History of Reparations 
Ernest Benn Ltd., 1927), p.57. 
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January 29 peace terms, The German government refused to 
accept the terms; thus, the Rhine parts of Duisburg, 
Dusseldorf, and Ruhrart were occupied by both Britain and 
France on March 8, 1921~3 Lloyd George was not in favor of 
this occupation, but felt that it was necessary to show a 
unified Allied stand to an insincere Germany and,at the 
same time, keep some control over Germany, Lloyd George 
said of the whole affair that the French needed to make up 
their mind as to whether they wanted the "enjoyment of 
trampling on Germany." Britain was strictly against 
''military adventure" and Lloyd George preferred "economic 
pressure to military." 24 Even though the sanctions imposed 
by the Allies were widely regarded as illegal at the time, 
Lloyd George supported the Paris plan of January 29, 1921, 
and firmly believed Germany would have to carry out the 
terms. 
In accordance with Article 233 of the Treaty of 
Versailles, the Reparations Commission finally issued its 
report on April 27, 1921, The Commission announced the 
total German reparation liability at six billion six-
hundred million pounds (the equivalent of thirty-three 
billion dollars). A conference was immediately held in 
London April 29-May 5 to determine a plan for Germany to 
23viscount D'Abernon, Versailles to Rapallo, p,133, 
24 
Viscount D'Abernon, Versailles to Rapallo, p.134. 
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meet this obligation and also to consider a new ultimatum 
to enforce the terms. The "London Schedule of Payments" 
and the ultimatum arrived in Berlin on May 6, 1921 and was 
accepted by the Germans on May 11, 1921, just twenty-four 
hours before the expiration on the time limit on the 
ultimatum. 25 
Since late 1919 the Allies had worked to find an 
answer to the reparation question. The British policy had 
proved itself essentially weak, and the British leaders 
did not effectively resist the policy of the French. 
Earlier, Georges Clemenceau, speaking of French 
security, said that "peace is a disposition of forces 
supposed to be in equilibrium, in which the moral force of 
organized justice is surrounded by strategical precautions 
against all possible disturbances." 26 Clemenceau was say-
ing that peace is a condition based on a balance of power 
of major nations who have as a goal strategical procedures 
designed to preserve that balance. And Clemenceau was 
quite worried that this equilibrium would be disturbed by 
a moderate Anglo-French settlement with the Germans. 
Throughout the whole conference period, Lloyd 
George was sympathetic to the fears of France, but he 
25carl Bergmann, History of Reparations, p.75. 
26Georges Clemenceau, Grandeur and Misery of 
Victory (New York1 Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1930), p.107. 
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opposed the harsh treatment France wished to administer to 
Germany. He later discovered that there was little he 
could do to resist France beyond verbal protests against 
her policies. His policy toward Germany was built upon 
reconciliation and rehabiliatation and not repression. He 
was deeply concerned with the economic prosperity of Great 
Britain and Europe economic prosperity which depended 
on an economically healthy Germany. Lloyd George therefore 
found French tactics distasteful, especially their insis-
tence on "productive guarantees" which meant the occupation 
and seizing of German land and property. 
Lloyd George's conference diplomacy policy has 
been condemned by his critics. The historian Gordon A. 
Craig has attacked Lloyd George for having ignored "foreign 
office experts in favor of the advice of private secretaries 
such as Philip Kerr. He presents evidence in support of 
Lloyd George"s attitude toward professional diplomats and 
their "formal correspondence and carefully drafted notes." 27 
Lloyd George believed that "Diplomats were invented simply 
to waste time, ... It is simply a waste of time to let 
(important matters) be discussed by men who are not author-
ized to speak for their countries." 28 It was Lloyd George's 
27Gordon A.Craig, "The British Foreign Office from 
Grey to Chamberlain", i:h The DiTlomats 1919-1939, ed. by 
Bordon Craig and Felix GilbertPrinceton1 Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1953), p.~7. 
28Gordon Craig, "Foreign Office•: p. 28. 
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way of avoiding the "old diplomacy" of the pre-war era, which 
had failed so utterly in preventing war and had caused so 
much crisis. Craig contends that Lloyd George did not know 
what he was about, so clearly seen when one looks at the 
"paucity of results attained by Lloyd Georgian diplomacy in 
the years 1919-1922. "29 So far as foreign policy was con-
cerned, Lloyd George either pursued his own and the Foreign 
Office was obliged either to come into line, once it had 
ascertained what his latest schemes might be, or else 
endeavor to countermand them at a lower level. Lloyd George 
was convinced that face-to-face confrontations between 
heads of state, and lengthy arguments a~ the conference 
table, were the only way to get things done. However, it 
seems apparent that there was little anyone could do to 
change the harsh attitude France had toward Germany and the 
Treaty. Britain was willing to compromise on virtually all 
matters, whereas the French felt that they had done all 
their compromising at Paris. 
In 1969 Stanley Baldwin's biographers repeated 
Gordon Craig's attack on Lloyd George almost word for word, 
They took the argument a bit further by putting forth the 
argument that no one in Britain was happy with Lloyd George's 
policy; they felt that in Britain there was an "unreason-
29Gordon Craig, "Foreign Office", pp,28-29. 
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And it was not an easy road for Lloyd George. He had to 
decide whether to support the French completely, for that 
is what they demanded, or to work for a modification of 
their demands, or to modify his own position. However, 
Harold Nicolson, in 1934, stated that Lloyd George's 
policies were not amiss. Nicolson felt that Lloyd George 
was "superb" as an originator of policy and that his con-
cepts for peace paralleled traditional concepts. Nicolson 
also believed that Lloyd George worked consistently to main-
tain the three principles of British foreign policy - "the 
command of the seas, the balance of power in Europe, and 
the defense of our imperial frontiers and communications," 31 
Nicolson was greatly impressed, as well, with the consist-
ency and moderate tone of Lloyd George's foreign policies. 
This, of course, is the basic thesis of this works that 
Lloyd George possessed a consistent and moderate concept of 
foreign policy and set himself to realizing it through his 
personal leadership. 
Conference Diplomacy might have been very pro-
ductive if France and Germany had been as convinced of the 
merit of the conferences as had Britain. But they were not. 
JOKeith Middlemas and John Barnes, Baldwin: A 
Biography (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), pp.106-107. 
31Harold Nicolson, Curzon, pp,54-55-
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It appears that the conference only served to heighten 
international tensions. Both Britain and France were set 
upon two different and probably uncompromising policies 
toward Europe. France sought to maintain her security 
through military pacts. Britain was opposed to this con-
tinued appeal to force. Instead, she sought to discourage 
armaments and encourage reconciliation of differences 
through cooperation and expedition of the economic recon-
struction of Europe; therefore, diplomacy by conference 
"proved evasive, imprecise, timid, empirical, and uncon-
structive ... 32 Lloyd George's diplomacy, in addition to 
heightening Anglo-French tensions, seemed to encourage 
Germany to exploit those differences to her advantage. 33 
It seems that Germany did exploit Anglo-French differences 
and was pleased about the general direction and conduct 
of Lloyd George's diplomacy. Unfortunately, the Germans 
often misinterpreted the seriousness of the rift. But the 
fact remains that a situation was created which permitted 
Germany to play one power against the other. 
Diplomacy by conference, and the subsequent de-
cline of the Foreign Office, did not spring completely from 
Lloyd George in 1919. Sir Maurice Hankey has written a 
1870-1939 
32Harold Nicolson, Curzon, p.187. 
33D.W.Brogan, The Development of Modern France 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1966), II, pp.558-580. 
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well-documented study of this very problem, demonstrating 
that, "Mr.Lloyd George has always been an enthusiastic 
advocate of the principle of diplomacy by conference." He 
proposed a major Allied conference in the Spring of 1915 to 
deal with Balkan problems, and Sir Hankey says that when 
Lloyd George became Prime Minister, "an immense impetus was 
given to the practice of diplomacy by conference. 034 
Lloyd George found support for his basic foreign 
policy aims from General Jan Smuts. Smuts was opposed to 
the final draft of the Treaty and had vigorously protested 
its terms. When General Smuts prepared to return to South 
Africa in 1919, he addressed an important farewell statement 
to England and the world. He expressed opinions which were 
shared by Lloyd George and evident throughout 1919-1922. 
Smuts reiterated his belief that Europe would never be 
stable until Germany became settled and stable; and Great 
Britain would never become presperous until Europe could 
become settled once more. "In our policy of European 
settlement, the appeasement of Germany therefore becomes of 
cardinal importance."35 His appeal could not have fallen on 
more sympathetic ears than Lloyd George's. Smuts had out-
lined what was to become the basis upon which Lloyd George 
34Lord Maruice Hankey, Diplomacy by Conference: 
Studies in Public Affairs 1920-191+6 (London: Ernest Benn Ltd., 
19 
35w.K.Hancock, Selections From Smuts, IV, #1057 
(July 18, 1919), pp.271-272, 
rested his policies: he assumed those policies would be 
implicit in his diplomacy by conference, 
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Lloyd George was constantly trying to bring 
France, Germany and all other concerned parties to the 
conference table to work out peaceful, moderate settlements 
which would preserve Anglo-French relations and the 
Versailles Treaty as well. But there was a fundamental 
difference in policy between France and Britain; and no 
matter how conciliatory Britain wished to be, she could 
not agree to all of the French terms, 
Chapter 6 
THE FINAL MOMENTS 
By December, 1921, it became clear that the repar-
ation problem had not been solved, Earlier, the German 
reparation debt had been established by the Reparation 
Commission as called for in the Versailles Treaty; but 
Germany's ability to meet her schedule of payments proved 
to be shortlived, On December 14, Germany informed the 
Reparation Commission that she would be unable to meet her 
payments for January and February 1922. The value of the 
German mark had begun to depreciate at a high speed and 
once again, a reparation crisis was at hand. So, the 
subsequent period, from 1921 to 1924, was a period of fre-
quent Allied conferences dealing with the problems of 
enforcing the May, 1921, schedule of payments, As before, 
there was almost constant tension between the French position 
and the more moderate British one. 
As a result of the German notice of December 14, 
1921, an Anglo-French Conference was held in London from 
December 18 to December 22, It was decided that the repara-
tion matter should be taken before the Supreme Council and 
that the whole economic reconstruction of Europe and the 
possibility of an Anglo-French defensive pact be considered, 
The meeting of the Supreme Council was held in Cannes, 
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January 6-13, 1922. There the British attempted an Anglo-
French reconciliation by offering France a defensive pact. 1 
And though the French and British were unable to conclude 
a broad defensive pact, it looked as though they might none-
theless make real progress toward the improvement of Anglo-
French relations. Unfortunately, the French Premier, 
Aristide Briand, was in trouble in Paris and on January 12, 
1922, he was forced to resign. He was succeeded by Raymond 
Poincare, First Chairman of Reparation Commission,as Premier 
of France. With his appointment, virtually all friendly 
Anglo-French collaboration in solving the reparation pro-
blem was gone. Poincare rigidly insisted upon a strict 
enforcement of the treaty; "he was a lawyer and he saw the 
case in simple legal terms. Germany was a defaulter on her 
obligations, a situation for which the law provided." 2 
On the same day that Poincare became Premier, the 
Reparation Commission announced that it would grant a 
moratorium on Germany's cash reparation payments. It would 
be a limited moratorium with Germany paying thirty-one 
million gold marks every ten days pending a final settlement. 
Germany was also to prepare a scheme of budget and currency 
reform. 
1J. Saxton Mills, The Genoa Conference (London: 
Hutchinson, 1922), p.J24. 
2 D.W.Brogan, Development of Modern France, p.573, 
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The Genoa meeting of the Supreme Council and the 
invited powers of Europe took place from April 10 to May 19, 
1922. It was also a dismal failure. The signing of the 
Rapallo Treaty between.Germany and Russia made Anglo-French 
negotiations with the German government even more difficult 
than they were. The Treaty of Rapallo made Poincare more 
determined than ever before to enforce the Versailles Treaty 
to the letter.3 
On August 1, 1922, the British made a sweeping 
offer, in the form of the Balfour Note, designed to reduce 
both inter-allied debts due to Britain and reparation due 
from Germany, if that were necessary to arrive at a peace-
ful international settlement. However, the Balfour note 
failed also, and it produced no favorable results at all. 
At the reparation conference held in London, 
August 7-14, 1922, the French sought what they termed 
"productive guarantees" to insure German reparation payment. 
These "productive guarantees" included the control of 
import-export licenses for the Rhineland occupied territory 
and collection of customs duties along Germany's western 
frontier. The British opposed almost every one of the 
French proposals and in turn submitted guarantee proposals 
of their own. Poincare rejected them almost point for point. 
Therefore, this Conference, like so many previous ones, 
3n.W.Brogan, Development of Modern France, p,574, 
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ended without reaching an agreement. 4 
The British continued to submit moratorium pro-
posals to the Reparation Commission, only to have them 
rejected by the French-dominated body. London made another 
attempt at an inter-allied settlement of the reparation pro-
blem at a conference in London December 9-11, 1922, but the 
British failed to make any progress. 5 
Meanwhile, a very important meeting of the Repara-
tion Commission was taking place. The G~rmans had been 
granted earlier in the year a moratorium on cash payments, 
but not on deliveries in kind. As a result of the tremen-
dous inflation of the mark the German government had fallen 
behind on her deliveries in kind. On December 22, 1922, 
the Reparation Commission declared Germany to be in default 
on her reparation deliveries. The British government waited 
expectantly for the French action she knew would be taken by 
France. Bonar Law, in a letter to Lord Curzon, said "I 
have no hope of the (upcoming) conference of January 2, 
unless something unexpected happens." 6 As expected, the 
French carried out their plan to occupy the Ruhr against 
British protests. The occupation, which began January 11, 
4CAB 23/30, WC 44, August 10, 1922, 
. 5David Lloyd George, Where Are We Going (New York: 
George H.Doran Company, 1923), pp,127-130, 
6Robert Blake, 
Life and Times of Andrew 






1923, proved costly for the French, but it did help to break 
German resistance. And as a result of the Ruhr occupation, 
the whole of the German industry collapsed. Poincare's 
policy became unpopular in France as taxes had to be raised 
by twenty per cent to cover the cost of the occupation. 
Poincare was turned out of office in 1924 and replaced by 
Edouard Herriot as Premier with Briand as Foreign Minister. 
Thus, the French changed their policy to a more moderate 
one and became more willing to negotiate. 
At this point, a British and American committee 
offered the Dawes Plan for approval, The Dawes plan pro-
vided for a reorganization of the German Reichsbank under 
Allied supervision. Reparations payments of one billion 
gold marks were to be made annually, increasing at the end 
of five years to two and one half billion. Germany was to 
receive a foreign loan of eight hundred million gold marks. 
The Committee was headed by the American banker Charles G. 
Dawes. The Dawes Plan did not attempt to revise the origi-
nal amount due from Germany. It was an answer to the repar-
ation problem and a means of helping the economy of Europe 
to recover. 
In Spetember, 1928,th~. Allies finally agreed to 
make a last attempt to determine Germany's reparation lia-
bility. A committee, under the direction of an American 
lawyer and President of General Electric, Owen Young, was 
created to study the problem. In June, the Young Committee 
93 
presented its report. The plan called for annuities ranging 
from two billion gold marks to one billion gold marks until 
1988. But the Young Plan had hardly been accepted when the 
world-wide depression that began in 1929 dealt a crushing 
blow to any hope of collecting reparation from Germany. On 
July 1, 1931, a moratorium on future reparation payments 
came into effect for twelve months. At the Conference of 
Lausanne in 1932 the German reparation bill was to be 
dropped except for one final payment of three billion marks. 
The entire period of reparation conferences, 1919-
1924, proved to be a period of one conference failure after 
another. N~ither side could hope to achieve its goals with-
out the cooperation of the other. The lengthy negotiation 
served only to define and emphasize the irreconcilable 
differences between France and Britain. 
Lloyd George maintained a continued faith in his 
ability to win peace in Europe through use of moderation 
and diplomacy by conference. His objective remained the 
sames disarmament; the economic reconstruction of Europe; 
and the return of Germany and the Soviet Union to the world 
diplomatic community. And in the face of the persistent and 
uncompromising opposition of France, Lloyd George maintained 
his faith that by bringing the French to the conference 
table, compromises could be reached. His policy toward 
Europe and his conduct of diplomacy at the conference table 
remained consisten~ and moderate throughout 1919-1922. 
Thus ended Lloyd George's diplomacy by conf'erence. 
Lloyd George had constantly tried to guarantee French 
security by offering her several defense pacts, but France 
refused. It seems apparent that it is the French who must 
bear the responsibility for the failure of Lloyd George's 
program of post-war reconciliation and reconstruction. It 
needs to be added that Lloyd George was not anti-French. 
He opposed post-war French policies because he believed 
these policies to be wrong. 
Throughout 1919-1922 Lloyd George carried the 
support of his cabinet with him to the numerous coni'erences 
of those years. Of course not every member of the Cabinet 
was fully in accord with him on all matters. Lloyd George 
never acted independently of his Cabinet, although it is 
equally apparent that he did on occasion ignore the valu-
able services of the Foreign Office. But the normal 
channels of diplomacy were too slow for Lloyd George. He 
wanted immediate decisions and this could best be done by 
meeting his foreign counterparts in person at international 
conferences. It was in diplomacy by coni'erence that Lloyd 
George sought to win reconciliation and peace. 
But Lloyd George had many critics. It seems that 
much of the coni'usion and myth which has grown up around 
Lloyd George's conduct of foreign policy has political 
origins. That is to say that Lloyd George was a politician 
and whatever he did had political implications. Two recent 
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publications, whose main subject is British Conservative 
politics, are very anti-Lloyd George in their treatment of 
both his domestic and foreign policies. 7 In any discussion 
of Stanley Baldwin or J.C.C. Davidson, anti-Lloyd George 
sentiment is bound to surface. But as in the biography of 
Baldwin, the substance of Lloyd George's policy toward 
France and Germany is submerged in politics, 
As has been discussed in earlier chapters, Lloyd 
George had established as early as January 1918 his general 
guidelines for achieving and maintaining peace in Europe, 
Even at this time, his plan was for the same moderate re-
conciliation and peace that he was still working for in 
1922. His policy remained consistent from 1918-1922. 
When Lloyd George resigned in October 1922, George 
V wrote in his diary, "some day he will be Prime Minister 
again. "8 But he never again held that post. This was his 
final separation from office, 
To the chaotic end of reparations in 1932, the 
British and Lloyd George remained faithful to a policy 
designed to revise the reparation clauses of the Versailles 
Treaty in favor of Germany and to restore economic order to 
Europe. However, British plans were continually hampered 
7Robert Rhodes James, ed., Mem ir er-
vative1 J.C.C.Davidson's Memoirs and Pa 
London: Macmillan, 19 9, and Keith Mi emas, a win. 
8Harold Nicolson, King George V, p.481, 
by the French. Neither France nor Britain would cooperate 
in order to achieve a common goal. Finally it was the French 
who reluctantly gave up their policy in favor of the more 
moderate British one, but for the latter it was not a joy-
ous victory, for the European economy had collapsed. 
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